Venture capital and the growth fetish

Felix Salmon has another smart post on venture capital and the way he feels it distorts American business:

Another way to look at this question is to compare US fight-to-be-number-one capitalism with the kind of capitalism practiced in undeniably successful countries like Germany, Korea, Brazil, and Japan. Those countries don’t have nearly as many world-beating behemoths as the US does, but overall their economies and current accounts are doing very well on a bedrock of medium-sized firms and family-owned corporations.

So in a way, Gobry is making my point for me. The IPO market and the VCs who feed off it are playing a game which might make a small number of people extremely rich, and which will create a very small number of hugely successful world-beating companies. They’re not playing a game which is good for founders; they’re not playing a game which is good for healthy, long-lived companies; and they’re not playing a game which is good for the economy as a whole. That’s kind of the point I’m making in the piece when I say that “Silicon Valley is full of venture capitalists who have become dynastically wealthy off the backs of companies that no longer exist”.

I think this fits nicely with one of our ongoing themes here at OE, the growth fetish:

Think of it this way, if we ignore all those questions about stakeholders and the larger impact of a company, you can boil the value of a business down to a single scalar: just take the profits over the lifetime of a company and apply an appropriate discount function (not trivial but certainly doable). The goal of a company's management is to maximize this number and the goal of the market is to assign a price to the company that accurately reflects that number.

The first part of the hypothesis is that there are different possible growth curves associated with a business and, ignoring the unlikely possibility of a tie, there is a particular curve that optimizes profits for a particular business. In other words, some companies are better off growing rapidly; some are better off with slow or deferred growth; some are better off simply staying at the same level; and some are better off being allowed to slowly contract.

It's not difficult to come up with examples of ill-conceived expansions. Growth almost always entails numerous risks for an established company. Costs increase and generally debt does as well. Scalability is usually a concern. And perhaps most importantly, growth usually entails moving into an area where you probably don't know what the hell you're doing. I recall Peter Lynch (certainly a fan of growth stocks) warning investors to put off buying into chains until the businesses had demonstrated the ability to set up successful operations in other cities.

But the idea of getting in on a fast-growing company is still tremendously attractive, appealing enough to unduly influence people's judgement (and no, I don't see any reason to mangle a sentence just to keep an infinitive in one piece). For reasons that merit a post of their own (GE will be mentioned), that natural bias toward growth companies has metastasised into a pervasive fetish.

This bias does more than inflate the prices of certain stocks; it pressures people running companies to make all sorts of bad decisions from moving into markets where you don't belong (Borders) to pumping up market share with unprofitable customers (Groupon) to overpaying for acquisitions (too many examples to mention).

I didn't consider the role of venture capital at the time. Perhaps I missed the biggest factor.

Misleading chart of the day

First, consider this chart (as reproduced by Matthew Yglesias):

Now examine Aaron Carroll's great rebuttal!

In general, I think Yglesias is correct that it is difficult to have any real reliability for 75 year cost projections (I wonder what the confidence limits are?).  So much is likely to change over this period of time and the prioirites of the nation may be so different that it is completely unclear how helpful such an exercise will be.  Not only do we have issues with technological and political change, but it would be odd if no future government altered policy priorities or if we could accurately guess economic growth over such a period. 

Freakonomics

Andrew Gelman's blog has a nice discussion of Freakonomics that is very topical given the discussion of Mike Daisy.  I think that he was a pretty balanced response to Stephen Dubner,who seemed to be rather distressed by the Andrew Gelman and Kaiser Fung response. Instead, I think that pointing out issues in a provocative and thought-provoking blog is essential. I admit that I often get very frustrated with the constant criticism of peer review. But it is essential to have errors pointed out and I have not seen a better way to have that happen then to have the mistakes repeatedly pointed out -- it sure makes me more careful as an epidemiologist.

One piece that I do think is worth reflecting on is this one:

Their first example of a “mistake” concerns a May, 2005, Slate column we wrote about the economist Emily Oster’s research on the “missing women” phenomenon in Asia. Her paper, “Hepatitis B and the Case of the Missing Women,” was about to be published in the Aug. 2005 issue of the Journal of Political Economy. At the time, Levitt was the editor of JPE, and Oster’s paper had been favorably peer-reviewed.  

Oster argued that women with Hepatitis B tend to give birth to many more boys than girls; therefore, a significant number of the approximately 100 million missing females might have been lost due to this virus rather than the previously argued explanations that included female infanticide and sex-selective mistreatment.  

Other scholars, however, countered that Oster’s conclusion was faulty. Indeed, it turned out they were right, and she was wrong. Oster did what an academic (or anyone) should do when presented with a possible error: she investigated, considered the new evidence, and corrected her earlier argument. Her follow-up paper was called “Hepatitis B Does Not Explain Male-Biased Sex Ratios in China.”

 I think that this missed the point of what was causing concern with this article.  An economist wanders into public health and overturns the conventional wisdom completely by considering a possible predictor but not really understanding why epidemiologists had not considered a disease-based explanation before.  It should not be considered a small point that the article showed up in an economics journal and not in a journal where it would be reviewed by experts in the clinical area. 

Is this necessary wrong to have reported potentially exciting new results?  No.  It is also true that people did put the effort into reporting when the understanding changed.  But this was in a well developed area of public health with very high policy stakes and people willing to put in a lot of effort to understand if there could be an alternate explanation.  So it induces some skepticism about "counter-intuitive" claims in areas where there are not the resources to scrutinize these claims deeply. 

Now it is natural that research has an error rate.  I wish it did not (especially not my research).  But it does point out the hazards of popularizing prelimary results.  I think I am especially sensitive to this issue as no field is more guilty of alarming and counter-intuitive findings than pharmacoepidemiology.  So I look for clues that make me cautious about publicizing preliminary results before they are really ready for prime time. 

The Mike Daisey incident illustrates the best in modern journalism

You might think that after some recent posts, I'd be reluctant to jump in with a counterintuitive headline like this and I'll admit I did hesitate a bit but I think the central point here is getting obscured and it's an incredibly important one.

We have always had and will always have people like Mike Daisey, serial fabulists with a gift for self-promotion. We will also always have journalistic sluggards who don't bother to check their facts and derivative hacks who pass on the conventional wisdom without scrutiny or independent thought.

The question is what do we do about these people, and the answer recently has generally been little or nothing. By comparison, the response to the Daisey incident was strong and apt and it gives us a simple template that, if followed, could go a long way toward fixing American journalism.

This is the rule: when you screw up, you take responsibility, try to set the story straight and (here is the essential part) you make your retraction at least as long and at least as prominent as the story you're apologising for.

These days, journalistic malpractice (when not ignored altogether) is generally punished by inclusion in a box that almost no one ever reads on the second page of a newspaper (and even that mild of a penalty is enough to generate whining and self-pity from journalists like David Carr*).

Just imagine what things would be like if errors in front page stories were always followed by front page corrections.






* From Fresh Air

"After I started [at the Times], I quickly ended up on page two ... the Corrections. They're not buried to us; that is a hall of shame ... it's a page you want to totally stay off of ... It doesn't matter where the error occurs — it always follows you around.

"Part of the deal of working at The New York Times is that your readers, a portion of whom are church ladies and copy ninnies and fact freaks, they wait like crows on a wire for you to make the slightest error and then descend, caw, caw, caw-ing, every time you screw up. It still is something that wakes me up at night."

21st century Journalism

I am not the biggest fan of Apple, but I have to admit that the Mike Daisy incident was dreadfully unfair to them.  Outsourcing to Adam Ozimek:

This is not consistent with anyone being able to walk up to Foxconn and within two hours be talking to underage workers. The story Daisey tells is one where Apple is negligent to an obvious and easily solved problem, whereas the facts TAL reports are of a company trying to stop underage workers and failing on relatively rare occasions. This kind of lie is not telling the story of the truth through a fictional narrative, but creating a fictional narrative that contradicts the bigger truth.

Felix Salmon also has some tough commentary on this issue. The key point here seems to be that it makes a great deal of difference what the facts are.  Outright falsehoods are an issue and it is terrifying that such obvious lies passed the fact checkers or that people feel like a defense can be mounted for this behavior as being in "in the greater good" (that the fictional narrative might be exposing hidden truths that are hard to show facts on). 

We should do better.   

Census documenting Great Depression to be released

This looks interesting:

NEW YORK (AP) — It was a decade when tens of millions of people in the U.S. experienced mass unemployment and social upheaval as the nation clawed its way out of the Great Depression and rumblings of global war were heard from abroad.

Now, intimate details of 132 million people who lived through the 1930s will be disclosed as the U.S. government releases the 1940 census on April 2 to the public for the first time after 72 years of privacy protection lapses.

You might think a personal finance story with the title “Boost your odds of winning the lottery”. couldn't be as bad as it sounds.

You'd be wrong.

How our inability to distinguish between independence and contrarianism encourages Steve Landsburg to be, let's just say, a less effective pundit

[I decided that the tone was getting a bit sharp in this debate so I'm dialing things down a bit. This entailed some very slight rewriting but none of these changes the substance of the post]

Before getting to the main thesis, let's confirm just how bad this incident was. A radio personality with millions of listeners grossly misrepresented the comments of a private citizen speaking out on an issue then used those distortions to make offensive and badly-reasoned attacks on the the woman. The situation at that point was bad enough but we don't really achieve horrible until Landsburg jumped in. Not only did Landsburg throw his reputation behind Limbaugh's illogical and factually challenged comments, he actually added additional [poor] arguments to the abuse this woman has had to put up with.

Noah Smith, Scott Lemieux, my co-blogger and others have done an excellent job addressing the lies and idiocy of this affair (check out how this blogger dismembers the I'm-mocking-the-postion-not-the-person defense) . The question for now is how this happened. How did a mid-level economist manage to reach such national prominence by writing a series painfully sophomoric books and articles?

Part of the answer, I'd argue, lies in the way journalists and editors now treat the counterintuitive. Publications like Slate give us a steady diet of pieces that take some claim that seems obviously true and argue the opposite. These publications would have us believe that this practice is a sign of intellectual independence and healthy diversity of opinion. It's not.

Contrarianism is closer to the opposite of independence, a point that's easiest to explain if we think in the idealized terms of a simplified fitness landscape. and draw an analogy between the defensibility of an argument associated with a certain position and the fitness of a phenotype associated with a certain genotype. (more on landscapes here)

Of course, it would take a lot of variables to realistically describe this landscape but the basic concepts still hold even if we simplify it to a bare-bones x, y and v(x,y). For every position (x,y) you can take, there's a resulting viability (v). Some positions are easy to defend (v is high). Some are difficult (v is low). Pundits and news analysts who try to find the best positions to argue are therefore performing an optimization algorithm (though most probably never thought about it in those terms).

For the most part, we can place this commentary and analyses in three general categories:

Neighborhood

Independent/semi-independent

Contrarian

The neighbor searcher tries to find the most defensible position within the neighborhood of a starting point. The best example I can think of here is the work David Frum specialized in until fairly recently. Frum was not being independent with his pieces in the Wall Street Journal or public radio (the terminal point of his searches was almost always within the neighborhood of the established conservative consensus) but he was arguably doing something as or more important, thoroughly exploring the landscape of the region and encouraging evolutionary shifts to sounder, more defensible positions.

The independent searcher, by contrast, goes where the search leads regardless of the starting position. The semi-independent searcher adds the condition that the terminal point has to be original (in other words, you can't end up on a point that someone else has already argued). Technically, originality and independence are in opposition here but in practice, they tend to complement each other.

And the two categories tend to complement each other as well. To grossly oversimplify, one group searches x+1 to x-1 and y+1 to y-1; the other group searches everywhere else. Given the fact the consensuses originally form around what seem at the time to be good ideas, it makes sense to explore their neighborhoods (if it helps, you could think of this in terms of Bayesian priors), but it also makes sense to keep exploring new territory. David Brooks and Frank Rich refine and improve their relative corners of the political landscape while writers like Jonathan Chait or William Safire range further and are more likely to reach unexpected conclusions.

The contrarian approach is to start with a position (x.y) that seems obviously true (often because it is true) then jump to either (-x,y) or (x,-y) and argue from there. It can, at first glance, look like the result of an independent search,but it is actually far more constrained than the neighborhood searches of Frum and Rich. Both of those writers would shift positions based on their reasoning and would insist on finding a defensible point before sitting down to the keyboard.

The typical contrarian piece hews so closely to its initial (-x,y) that there's no indication of a search at all. By all appearances, the writer simply jumps to the contrarian position and starts typing.

Contrarian writing crowds out good journalism and pumps misinformation and faulty arguments into the discourse. This would be bad at any time, but in the current state of journalism, it's disastrous. Here's a list of dangerous trends in journalism from an earlier post (with a link added from a different paragraph):

1. Reliable information sources like the CBO are undermined;

2. An increasing amount of our information comes from unreliable subsidized sources like Heritage;

3. Journalists suffer no penalty for publishing inaccurate information;

4. Journalists also fashion for themselves an incredibly self-serving ethical rule that lets them, in the name of balance, avoid the consequences that would have to be faced if they honestly assigned responsibility for screw-ups;

5. A growing tendency to converge on a narrative makes the media easier to manipulate.

All of these factors make it more difficult for our society to deal with bad data and contrarians are a rich source of some of the worst.

In a healthy journalistic system, counter-intuitive claims would be held to a higher standard (at least if we think like Bayesians) and if a logically or factually flawed argument made it through, both the authors and the editors would feel pressure to see that it didn't happen again.

In our current system, counter-intuitive claims are held to a lower standard (because they generate traffic) and serial offenders can actually build careers by badly arguing points that probably aren't true. Editors have lost all interest in fact-checking and outside efforts at debunking are usually treated as he said/she said.

It's easy to object to the positions Landsburg takes, but perhaps the truly offensive aspect here is the way Landsburg and the other contrarians reach those positions.

Andrew Gelman weighs in

Mark Palko asked me to post a link to Andrew Gelman's really interesting discussion about "economics exceptionalism". 

My own take-away is that I had not thought about the intellectual dominance of Freudian thinking for a long time and I had never made the link to economics.  But there were occasional forays of economics into areas like education and public health that I have spent some time talking about.  By now we all know the idea behind Freakonomics (even if it might be largely a marketing ploy, it has some intelelctual cachet).   The issue with Ray Fisman and teacher retention policy (should we fire 80% of new teachers) has seen a lot of discussion on this blog and I consider it a classic example of this type of economics reasoning exported to a more general subject matter.  (which is not a dig at Ray Fisman who appears to be a brilliant thinker on his own turf). 

So go, read, and enjoy the comments! 

Futurism

Something that Mark and I have been talking about is how much less audacious we have been (as a country) since the 1950's.  Back then there was a real sense of inevitable progress and an idea that there were great accomplishments lurking around the corner.  Noah Smith weighs in with an example of this:

If we had found better ways to unlock the vast stores of energy that we know are lurking inside the nuclei of atoms, we'd have those flying cars and Mars colonies and everything people thought we'd have back in the 50s (OK, the Economist doesn't say that, but it's true).

When did we lose this ambition and can we get it back?  

Presented without comment

From Paul Krugman:

From KCRW:

Faced with state funding cuts, Santa Monica College can’t keep up with student demand. The school’s governing board has approved a plan to provide extra classes after the regular ones are full. But while regular classes will cost $46 a unit the extras will be $180.

Addendum

Daniel Kuehn has posted a clarification of his position on his blog making it clear that his post was not intended as a defense of Steve Landsberg's position on the Sandra Fluke issue.

There is still an interesting argument about how modern readers seem to give more weight to counter-intuitive arguments than intuitive ones.  Landsberg's career seems to be based on this approach.  Bayesian thinking says that we should do the reverse -- and I think that it would be useful to the debate if we remembered such things.

Not thinking like an economist vs. not thinking, like an economist

Noah Smith has an excellent post on the strange tendency of some economists to treat offensiveness as a sign of clear-thinking. You should read the whole thing, but first I want to take a moment to focus on this quote by Daniel Kuehn:

A lot of people don't get "thinking like an economist" when they see it, [In this case, the people who don't get "thinking like an economist" include Brad DeLong and Noah Smith, but I digress -- Mark*] and what I think Landsburg is doing here is "thinking like an economist", not being a jerk...

Thinking like an economist simply means that you scientifically approach human social behavior - which means that you approach them like any other species of animal. Nobody judges animals when they behave in ways that we would consider horrendous in other humans. They're just... animals. And that's what you really need for good social science. You need to look at your fellow humans as "just animals". Astonishing, wondrous animals to be sure - but just animals...

It's absolutely critical for good economists to see the world in this way...I suspect [Landsburg] was "thinking like an economist". The problem is, of course, it flowed over from scientific analysis of human behavior to a commentary on a single individual human being[.]

[Landsburg] dotted all his i's and crossed all his t's on the analysis, because he's good at thinking like an economist.

We've been through this before. Steve Levitt used the thinking-like-an-economist line to dismiss critics. I found it lacking at the time and it hasn't grown on me since then but it should be noted that even at his worst, Levitt is making an effort to approach questions scientifically. I don't believe that a majority (or even a plurality) of Levitt's critics disagree with him because he's too logical, but at least it's a claim that can be made with a straight face.

Landsburg's defense of Limbaugh is an entirely different beast. There's no trace of a scientific process here or of any thoughtful process at all for arriving at a position. Landsburg simply reacted angrily when he saw people he didn't like say things he disagreed with. Unfortunately, he expressed that anger with a spectacularly shoddy attempt at an argument that misrepresented the original facts, mangled the reasoning and required the reader to make up new definitions for most of the operative words.

By applying it to Landsburg's Fluke post, Kuehn has stretched the thinking-like-an-economist defense to the point that if covers pretty much any statement, no matter how incoherent, as long as it includes something offensive to the general public.

(for more to this topic, check out this post by Andrew Gelman.)


UPDATE: Daniel Kuehn argues here that Smith misrepresented his original post. Read both and come to your own conclusion.

* And just to be clear, this bracketed statement was an editorial insert by me, not an aside by Kuehn.

How sure are you that your models are correct?

Karl Smith makes a really good point:

Now imagine that you withheld a payroll tax cut or food stamp relief or any other program on the basis of fear about long term budgets. Depending on your macro estimates somewhere between millions and hundreds of millions of people suffered for this. 

What did you get in return for their suffering? 

Absolutely nothing. Nothing. Nothing. 

Every time you ask a real living person to suffer for some future goal you have to know that you are betting their well-being on your being right about the future. 

How sure are you that you are right? 

Austerity costs with probability one. Attempting to effect long term growth is always a gamble.

I do think that this point is worth remembering in policy discussions.  Models of distant time periods (say 30t o 50 years in the future) are subject to dramatic changes in assumptions.  Could the people living in 1890 (who had never seen a plane) have imagined what 1940 (and the air war of the Battle of Britain) would be like?

This is not to say that we should be reckless.   But policies like austerity in a time of high unemployment have immediate and real costs.  To presume that one is really preparing for the future one should be really, really confident that one can predict it . . .

EDIT: As a clarification, this is much more salient for things like Health Care costs where things like technological progress could completely change the growth curve and less of an issue for Global Warming where we have an observable and deterministic physical process.

And things get worse . . .

Avik Roy part 2:

The VA system could be turned into a huge asset for our nation's health-care system if it were privatized. One of the big drivers of rising health spending is hospital monopolies: when one or two hospitals dominate a particular region, those hospitals have the power to charge whatever they want to insurers and patients. If civilians were allowed to use VA hospitals, and vice-versa for veterans, we could significantly improve this problem. In addition, if the VA hospitals have indeed come up with operational efficiencies, competing private-sector hospitals would be forced to adopt those efficiencies, or lose patients.

If liberals are right, and the VA is a model, competition will force private hospitals to improve on both quality and cost. If conservatives are right, and VA hospitals are terrible, privatization would allow veterans to gain access to superior private-sector health care, while increasing provider competition. Seems like a win-win.

So if I think that a single payer model creates efficiency then the way to test that would be to privatize the system so that we could see if it was equally good as a multi-payer system.  The things that make a single payer system efficient -- less adminsitrative overhead, rationing, ability to implement cost-effective standards of care, no need to run at a profit -- would all vanish in a competitive market place.  Because each insurance plan would have different rules and paperwork requirements which would rapidly undermine a lot of the single payer efficiency. 

So how is abandoning the model used by liberals (single payer) to privatize VA hospitals going to work out as a "win-win"? 

The best analogy I can come up with is comparing a privately held company to one that is publicly traded.  The idea that the private company should become publicly traded so that one can judge if it is more efficient than the publicaly traded company ignores the possibility that it is more efficient because it is privately held. 

So I think that this idea isn't going to show what Mr Roy claims it will show.