Fiscal responsibility

As we get further into the debt conversation, I think this is worth remembering:

People have largely forgotten about this, but back in the 1999–2001 era instead of complaining about the deficit being too high conservatives were obsessed with the need to prevent the national debt from getting too low. The reason was that they feared that there might not be enough "on-budget" debt for the Social Security Trust Fund to buy, which would lead the Social Security Trust Fund to act like the Canada Pension Plan and start investing in equity and other financial vehicles. This, according to Alan Greenspan and others, would rapidly put us on the road to serfdom.

But as sovereign wealth funds are spreading from Persian Gulf petrodictatorships to oil-free dictatorships (Singapore) and oil-rich democracies (Norway) and now even America's friendly next door neighbor Canada, I think it's time to rethink this opinion.

And also this:

But the larger point here, surely, is that Rehn has let the mask slip. It’s not about fiscal responsibility; it never was. It was always about using hyperbole about the dangers of debt to dismantle the welfare state. How dare the French take the alleged worries about the deficit literally, while declining to remake their society along neoliberal lines? 

In a sense I think we should be mad at the Austerity advocates for hopelessly confusing the debt issue.  Debt is bad but increased taxation is always worse seems to be the argument.  But by trying to confuse the issues they are merging two very different propositions.  High taxation can be bad but the evidence for this is much weaker than for government financial crisis due to debt loads. 

But it becomes impossible to talk about the debt without getting drawn into the quagmire of the appropriate level of taxes.  But it is notable that the argument against running a surplus appears to be bogus (the disaster of paying off the debt seems to not be a disaster elsewhere).  The level of taxes in the United States is low relative to other first world countries -- that makes it hard to argue that small tax increases would immediately lead to disaster. 

This is making me want to be almost dismissive of the deficit.  Not because the debt wouldn't be lower in my ideal world, but because all of the action is about the size and scope of government (and a strange argument about whether government should be intrusive at the federal or state level).  These are interesting arguments, to be sure, but they are only distantly related to the question of fiscal responsibility.

The 401(k) world

There has been some real tough reflection on tax expenditures recently.  I have always seen 401(k) and IRA savings vehicles as being a better than average idea for using this approach.  It's sure better than tax advantaging investment income, which is very interesting in the abstract but in the real world seems to flow to the best off. 

But people are making some solid points about whether this is really a good idea or not.  If they don't work to incentivize the right behavior on the part of either consumers or vendors than maybe they are not an ideal retirement savings approach.

James Kwak:

The first is that they go overwhelmingly to people who don't need them -- like my wife and me. As two university professors living in Western Massachusetts, where the cost of living is low, we make more than we need to support our lifestyle. We max out our defined contribution plans every year, and because we're in a relatively high tax bracket (28%, I think), we save thousands of dollars a year on our taxes. This is the problem with most subsidies that are delivered as tax deductions. Their cash value depends on the amount you can deduct and on your marginal tax rate. In this case, fully 80 percent of retirement savings tax subsidies goes to households in the top income quintile. (See Toder, Harris, and Lim, Table 5.)

The second problem is that these tax incentives don't work. They don't cause people to save more. In my case, the amount we save is just our income minus our consumption, and our consumption isn't affected by the tax code. If there were no tax subsidy, we would save the same amount and just pay more in taxes. And it's not just us. A recent and widely discussed paper by Raj Chetty, John Friedman, Soren Leth-Petersen, Torben Heien Nielsen, and Tore Olsen looked at what happened when the Danish government reduced tax subsidies for retirement savings by rich people. The short answer is that decreases in retirement savings were almost perfectly matched by increases in non-retirement savings. The overall effect, they estimate, is that for every dollar in tax subsidies, total savings go up by one cent. The other ninety-nine cents is just a handout to people who would have saved anyway.

Matt Yglesias

Middle class retirement savings isn't like that. We know roughly how much people need to put away in order to retire with a standard of living they'll be comfortable with. And we definitely know what kind of investment vehicles are most appropriate for middle class savers. And we have abundant evidence that, left to their own devices, a very large share of middle class savers will make the wrong choices. What's more, because of the nature of the right choices it's obvious that the dominant business strategy for vendors of middle class investment products is to dedicate your time and energy to developing and marketing inferior products, since the essence of superior products in this field is that they're less remunerative.
 

The most convincing part is the whole question of how 401(k) plans are designed to reduce consumer choice and the resulting incentive to offer inferior products.  After all, the employer setting up the 401(k) has little incentive to make sure that difficult to spot fees don't eat up other people's money. 

The alternative, at this point, is social security.  I am very sympathetic to arguments that assets are just claims and that providing for the elderly ultimately turns into a resource sharing problem.  The difference appears to be that social security would divide the resources we put towards older adults more equitably than tax-advantaged savings plans do. 

Health Care Costs

We have known for a while that the United States spends a lot on health care. What is interesting is that the direction seems to be moving in the wrong way both in terms of life expectancy and cost:

You can see that not only is the United States the outlier when it comes to spending, but we are moving in the wrong direction: we are becoming more of a spending outlier, and we are drifting down from the average life expectancy into the lower group (currently surpassing only Turkey, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Czech Republic).

and

The other thing you see is that our life expectancy gain was the absolute lowest of the whole group (and we weren’t starting from a particularly high level, as you can see in the previous chart).

Ordinarily, you would think there should be convergence across countries. Since other countries spend less and live longer, you would think that we would learn from them—global competition, you know. But instead we’re moving the wrong way on both dimensions.

The article and neat charts are worth looking at in their entirety.

Now, it is true that there can be a lot of reasons for low life expectancy and high medical costs. It could be that the environment in the United States makes us much more accident prone, for example, requiring both higher spending and more fatalities.

But, in general, it is uncomfortable when the most important metric of health care outcomes (all cause mortality) is so uncorrelated with cost. This suggests the possibility of productivity improvements. I read a lot of the Incidental Economist, who try to explain these issues. But I admit that I tend to come away confused.

The major comparison is often Canada. It is a bad reference on a lot of levels (as they have their own issues). But they have similar culture, ethnic diversity, large geography, heavy use of cars, high levels of obesity and yet they are improving on both metrics (from a lower level of cost and higher life expectancy at baseline).

Why is health care the one area that we aren't willing to look at how other countries have been successful and try to steal ideas?

Speaking of epicycles...

James Kwak has a beautiful stone-by-stone dismantling of this paper by Bryan Caplan and Scott Beaulier.

The paper argues that welfare programs expand the set of choices available to people; while that is all good according to traditional economics, if we think that people are inclined to make bad choices (“behavioral economics”), then welfare programs give people more opportunity to make bad choices and hurt themselves. This is particularly a problem because, they claim, “there are good empirical reasons to think that behavioral economics better describes the poor than it does the rest of the population” (p. 4). In other words, if poor people are more irrational, then giving them more choices will hurt them more than other people.

Kwak takes it all apart, from the odd and strangely uninformed take on behavioral economics to the lack of supporting data to the ready supply of superior alternative hypotheses to the generally poor quality of the authors' reasoning. If this zombie claws its way out of the grave after Kwak is through with it then there's just no killing the damned thing.

One thing that is obvious from this paper is that Caplan and Beaulier have reached the epicycle stage.* They are no longer focused on finding the best model to fit the data; instead they are trying to salvage an intellectual framework that is based on elegant principles and appealing ideas like just desserts and efficient markets.

The shift from serving the data to serving the theory is easy to make and difficult to catch. Every new theory occasionally runs into a phenomena it has trouble explaining. Explaining them can be a good thing. The process of taking a theory into the counter-intuitive is an important, even necessary step in its evolution.

There is, however, one condition: the explanation you finally come up has got to be as good or better than any of the alternative hypotheses. Otherwise, the theory isn't evolving; it's decaying.



* The Wikipedia article on the subject suggests I'm being unfair to Ptolemy. I hope not -- I'd hate to have to come up with a new analogy.

“We've made enormous advances in what they're called” -- more on corporate data cooking

Yesterday, I mentioned how bundled offers and the ability to pick the most advantageous data could allow a company to produce any number of grossly dishonest statistics. Today over at Baseline Scenario, James Kwak explains how J.P. Morgan can use acquisitions and flexible definitions to perform similar magic with its promise to loan $10 billion to small businesses:

Still, $10 billion is still an increase over the previous high of $6.9 billion in 2007, right? Well, not quite. Because in the meantime, JPMorgan Chase went and bought Washington Mutual. At the end of 2007, Washington Mutual held over $47 billion in commercial loans of one sort or another (from a custom FDIC SDI report that you can build here). Most of those are not small business by JPMorgan’s definition, since commercial real estate and multifamily real estate got put into the Commercial Banking business after the acquisition. But that still leaves $7.5 billion in potential small business loans, up from $5.1 billion at the end of 2006, which means WaMu did at least $2.4 billion of new lending in 2007.

I don’t know how much of this is small business lending, but this is part of the problem — banks can choose what they call small business lending, and they can choose to change the definitions from quarter to quarter. It’s not also clear (from the outside, at least) what counts as an origination. If I have a line of credit that expires and I want to roll it over, does that count as an origination? My guess is yes. Should it count as helping small businesses and the economy grow? No.