Marginal Revolution has amazing comments

This has led me to quote a few of the best points made in the latest discussion on tenure. From PQuincy:

By the way, I do admit that tenure (which I, like Tyler, possess), may lead to the payment of rents, and to some rent-seeking behavior. But if anyone claims that, say, the modern financial sector involves no rents and rent-seeking, I'll laugh out loud. The better question is to ask what the negative burden of rents in universities is compared to potential benefits of a system that awards some kind of tenure. Given that few university professors make very much money, my first guess (no doubt shaped by self-interest) is that tenure is a relatively inexpensive way to achieve certain hard-to-value-but-real outcomes.

This does make a point that is often absent from the debate-- when we say that tenure is a form of rent-seeking is it really the current highest priority? After all, financial services are able to create all sorts of captive income streams (think of fees on 401(k) accounts) that are both more expensive and harder to justify.

From Cliff Bekar

Evaluating a good hire into an academic department is expensive. It would be very expensive for managers (Deans, Provosts, etc.) to evaluate the contributions of an academic to a literature. Hiring an outside firm would also prove a challenge given the huge variance in academic performance and the length of time it takes to determine whether a good hire has been made (it can often take 6+ years for agents to fully realize their research potential). Academics within a discipline have a comparative advantage in making such determinations (as an economic historian I would be at a significant disadvantage in evaluating, say, a new econometrician). Further, since the quality of their department stands to gain the most from making a good hire, academics within the department have an incentive to maximize the quality of hire. But imagine that the people in charge of the hire may be fired. In practice decisions to fire an academic will always be made in part relative to the standards of a department/institution. An agent that is performing poorly relative to their colleagues is more likely to be let go. A 50-year old academic, who might lose their job if faced with high performing colleagues faces perverse incentives in the hiring process. Tenure renders the agents who are best able to evaluate talent with the good incentives to hire the best possible fit. This effect is even more important if we consider other elements of an academic hire that make "insiders" better at evaluating potential fits: What types of courses would the existing student mix best benefit from, what comparative weaknesses in the curriculum should be addressed with a new hire, what is the culture of the department? Good answers to these questions are often hard to answer by simply accumulating the kind of data a third party (recruiting firm or Dean) could cheaply secure.

This is a fantastic point and really shows how tenure could work to increase excellence. Now, it is true that this argument worked a lot better with a mandatory retirement age (as end of career issues are proving sticky) but that seems like a possible point of intervention, doesn't it? Making tenure no longer automatically protect jobs after the eligibility age for social security would be the example of a small tweak that radically improves the system.

Finally:

No institution is perfect; tenure is no exception. But it is a way to allign faculty interests with the long term interests of their institutions. In this era of 5-year-turnover-administrators, without tenure what makes anyone think that short term administrators will do what is in the long term interest of their current institutions?

It's hard to align interests effectively given short term windows (industry constantly grapples with this issue) and tenure seems like a cheap way to do it in a very strong way.

It's not an accident that Marginal Revolutions was the blog that first got me to read blogs. Very insightful stuff.

Seyward Darby -- now not even pretending to think things through

The idea that the proposed educational reforms will magically fix everything has become so ingrained in Darby's thinking she has started writing things like this:

Will states, school districts, and unions also agree to revise, in the long term, the ways teachers are hired, compensated, and fired, hopefully precluding the need for mass layoffs in the future?

Even if there weren't serious problems with the proposed metrics for compensating and firing teachers, even if the changes were to do everything the advocates have claimed, how would these changes have any effect on the pro-cyclic economic policies of states? Has anyone even suggested a relationship here?

And if we're not limited to cases where there is some sort of likely causal relationship, why limit ourselves to lay-offs? Why not have something like this: "Will states, school districts, and unions also agree to revise, in the long term, the ways teachers are hired, compensated, and fired, hopefully ending future violence in the Middle East, curing cancer and preventing future movie version of SNL sketches?"?

What the hell, dream big.

A quick note on tenure and the economics of deferred compensation

(Joseph may be through with this, but I'm just getting started.)

One of the many weird things about the exceedingly weird tenure debate is the way many (hell, most) of the participants talk about tenure as a gift to teachers rather than a form of compensation that's part of a highly competitive market. *

All forms of deferred compensation offer two attractive features to employers: they reduce the initial cost and they encourage retention. Both of these features are particularly attractive to school administrators who work in an incredibly labor-intensive industry, can't offer big salaries, often require employees to move to out-of-the-way towns and can't afford to have their best people move on the moment a better offer comes along.

If you eliminate tenure you will have to come up with an alternative compensation plan that accomplishes the same thing and with the possible exception of Tyler Cowen, no one seems to show any interest in what that alternative might be.




* Of course you can also talk about tenure as a way of protecting academic freedom and discouraging grade inflation, though no one does anymore.

One last post on Tenure

I am not surprised that Tyler Cowen is asking the hard question that is at the center of the tenure debate. Namely, what is the plan forward if we replace tenure.

In particular, he asks for a concrete number for how the wage equilibrium shifts if tenure is removed:

If firing is in order, how much higher do initial wage offers have to be?

Megan McArdle gave a "toy example" that seemed more rhetorical than actual. In point of fact, moving to a small university town as a highly educated professional might be a major decision. True, in some disciplines there is a real case for a criminal over-production of PhD-level credentials. But it seems odd that the solution to this problem is to make the one part of the job chain that is actually good into something that is worse.

I'm always delighted by Tyler Cowen's insights and recommend reading the whole thing.

Paul Krugman and the limitations of historical analysis

I really like this post from Paul Krugman both for the reasoning and, more importantly, his awareness of the limitations.

So, about the first point: economic history is a great source of evidence about how the economy works – in fact, pretty much our only source. And the RR project, drawing on evidence from much further back and farther afield than usual among economists, was a great idea.

But there are usually major problems with historical analysis, no matter how much data you have, because it’s very difficult to isolate the things you’re interested in. There’s an old line to the effect that everything in the economy affects everything else, in at least two ways; this gives enormous room for spurious correlation. Econometrics is supposed to provide ways to disentangle the effects of multiple factors, but it’s difficult, and my sense is that few big arguments in economics have ever been settled by multiple regression analyses, let alone by all the sophisticated techniques developed these past three generations.

But Reinhart-Rogoff is relatively robust to these problems. Why? Because it focuses on extreme events. Financial crises are very big things, sharply concentrated in time. As a result, it’s reasonably certain that the economic developments in the aftermath of a financial crisis were driven by that crisis, not by other stuff that may have been going on.

Of course, not all economists are so careful when it comes to drawing their conclusions.

More on Tenure

I usually really like DeadDad. But this line in his post today:

It’s about recognizing that the tenure system feeds the adjunct system, and that the only way to get rid of the latter is to get rid of the former.

seemed to strike a really odd note. It seems to be assuming that if you removed job security (aka tenure) from the people with benefits then you would see adjuncts being treated better. This statement assumes a couple of things. One, is that there is a pile of resources locked up by older professors who refuse to work or retire. Two, it assumes that (in no sense) can we consider a gradual fading out of the job to be a form of delayed compensation for the early years of fighting for tenure. I am not sure what it is about deferred compensation that makes people want to break agreements about it so badly but it's certainly a new epidemic.

Finally, he assumes that a surplus generated by reducing the costs of tenure would not be eaten up by: a) administration, b) higher compensation to star professors to account for lower job security or c) reduced funding to the university.

One of the things that tenure works against is the principal agent problem of state agencies: it is hard for a government to regulate bad management without the appearance of corruption. Minimizing the changes that can be done under a single term as a senior administrator (also seen in the civil service) would seem to be a partial solution.

"The Double-blind Job"

I'm not much of a Leverage fan -- if you're in the mood for a caper show I'd stick with Burn Notice and Mission Impossible (the series, not the loud and largely brainless movies) and if you want to see more Gina Bellman there's Blackeyes, Coupling and Jekyll -- but between the title and the setting of the episode below, I just had to post this.

The ASA was out of its mind to give Felix Salmon a reporting award

Is the American Statistical Association even vaguely familiar with the internet? Don't they understand how the blogosphere food chain works? One blogger says something mind-numbingly stupid which causes a wave of outraged and mocking posts in response which causes yet another wave of defences and accusations of hypocrisy.

Obviously the award should have gone to someone like Ben Stein (the phytoplankton of the blogosphere). Stein's writing is filled with the kind of nutrient-rich raw material that bloggers (including Salmon) can write about endlessly.

By comparison, bloggers trying to subsist on Salmon posts are usually left writing things like "Felix Salmon has an interesting analysis of..." or "Salmon makes an important point about..." or "Check out..."

On a related note:

Check out these very amusing posts by Felix Salmon: the first looks at the MBA-Tourette's that afflicts so many online editors; the second has fun with the aforementioned Ben Stein's claim the unemployed deserve to be out of work.

Salmon also has a devastating analysis of CNBC's muddled take on counterfeiting.

And while you're there, take a look at this post that makes an important point about the nomination of Elizabeth Warren for head of the CFPB.

Hell, just read the whole damned blog.

Bad public policy

I want to put together this post by John D Cook:

We can’t use common sense because it doesn’t fit on a form.

We can’t treat people like people because that doesn’t scale well.

We can’t use a simple approach to solve the problem in front of us unless the same approach would also work on a problem 100x larger that we may never have.

If the smart thing to do doesn’t scale, maybe we shouldn’t scale.

with this post by Radley Balko about a note sent home because a child was too heavy:

•Back when I wrote about the obesity debate for Cato, I remember when public schools telling parents their kids are too fat was the sort of thing people on my side of the debate warned about, and people on the other side of the debate said was ridiculous hyperbole. Also, the kid’s BMI is 19.4, and the school is sending home fat warnings? Why not just go ahead and build a vomitorium next to the girls bathroom?

Now, it is true that the person in question was in the 85th percentile for her group. But let us be clear here: if every single person in America had a healthy weight then somebody would still be in the 85th percentile. By definition.

We don't talk epidemiology enough on this blog (given the title) so this is a good tiem to talk about the need for careful developed public health policies. All that badly designed policies like this will do is to make it harder to implement effective and useful interventions.

To link this back to the quote at the beginning, blanket policies like this need to include nuance or else they are at risk of doing more harm than good. If we can't design a policy that can avoid these kinds of absurd outcomes then we should really be thinking about whether the area is a good one to implement policies in. But bad policies are worse than no policies . . .

This is exactly right

Candid Engineer has a very nice post about focusing on the things in your control. Luck is a major part of success but luck definitely favors the prepared. In the long run, it pays to focus on what you can control and let things onfold as they may.

New blog alert

David Warsh highly recommends this new blog by journalist Bill Bulkeley. I don't agree with his take on these companion pieces from the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal about Teach for America (time permitting I'll elaborate later), but he makes some good points and asks right question.

Definitely a site we'll want to keep an eye on.

The yahoos at Yahoo

A few days ago, the Yahoo homepage featured a Bankrate.com article that consisted of an amazing assortment of bad advice on homes as investments. I posted a rebuttal, but I could have simply waited for a few days and linked to this article from U.S. News which was also featured on the Yahoo homepage and which explains why everything the earlier piece said about home ownership was wrong.

I realize that Yahoo's homepage is not exactly a publication, but it does have tremendous reach and it would be nice if they hired someone to actually read what they post.

Divergent and Convergent Learning

As much as I complained about them at the time, the education classes I had to take to get certified did have some highly useful concepts. One of those was the distinction between convergent learning (where you want all students to reach the same final answer) and divergent learning (where you want each student to come up with a unique answer). Before you made a lesson plan or write a test, you were supposed to ask yourself where you want to see convergence and where you want to see divergence.

[There is an obvious connection between this divergent learning and the creativity discussion here, here, here and here]

There is an common but fatally naive misconception that convergent learning goes with math and science while divergent learning goes with arts and humanities. Almost all subjects start with a large convergent learning component including the arts (try picking up an instrument and see how much divergence your teacher tolerates in the first few lessons). More importantly, ALL subjects are fundamentally divergent at a high enough level. Writing a novel, composing a symphony, proving a conjecture or designing an aircraft are all creative exercises in constrained problem solving. We demand that certain conditions be met but we expect that each solution (or at least the method behind it) will be unique.

Which begs the disturbing question: will the proposed educational reforms produce more or fewer of the divergent thinkers we actually need?



p.s. Liam Hudson came up with a uses of objects test to measure divergent thinking. It ignores the complex interaction between possibility and constraint and is therefore, in my ever-humble opinion, complete crap, but take a look anyway.

Bias versus precision

In epidemiology, we are typically trying to estimate an unbiased measure of associations between an exposure and an outcome. Generally, we punt on the causal question of "does exposure X cause outcome Y?", but it is inevitably in the background. After all, if we say that poor exercise habits are associated with early mortality it is generally taken as an advisory to consider improving one's exercise habits rather than as an interesting coincidence.

But not all models are confounding models and the instincts that serve us so well for confounding models can be misleading for predictive models. Nate Silver has a very well explained example of how inaccurate (or, to be more formal, imprecise) predictive models can be worse than biased models. It's a very interesting confusion between bias and precision but it makes me wonder if we don't focus too much on unbiased and too little on efficiency for some of our models.

Thoughts?

More on creativity and slippery metrics

John D Cook has a interesting take on the whole creativity question. I'm not sure that I accept the premise that schools have as much influence on these factors as people think. But it does bring up an interesting point of the tail wagging the dog.

On of the classic criticism of scientific management is that they took a good idea (try and find measureable metrics of business success and failure) and turned it into a myopic focus on what is easy to measure in a spreadsheet. As a result, they focused on easy to measure metrics of success and, in the process, tended to neglect things that are hard to measure.

It's obviously true that creativity is a slippery and hard to measure concept. It is hard to, for example, design a standardized test around it. I wonder if part of the issues of education reform come from a focus on what can be measured and not what is important?