Thursday, March 24, 2022

Twelve years ago at the blog -- part II

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Blockbusters, Franchises and Apostrophes

More on the economics of genre fiction

The story so far: last week Andrew Gelman had a post on a book that discussed the dominance of best seller lists and suggested that it was due to their increased quality and respectability. I argued that the quality and respectability had if anything decreased (here), posted some background information (here and here) then discussed how the economics of publishing from the late Nineteenth Century through the Post-War era had influenced genre fiction. The following closes with a look at where we are now and how the current state of the market determines what we're seeing at the bookstore.

As the market shrank in the last part of the Twentieth Century, the pay scale shifted to the feast and (mostly) famine distribution of today. (The century also saw a similar shift for musicians, artists and actors.) Non-paying outlets sprang up. Fan fiction emerged (non-licensed use of characters had, of course, been around for years -- Tiajuana bibles being a classic example -- but fan fiction was written for the author's enjoyment without any real expectation of payment). These changes are generally blamed on the internet but the conventional wisdom is at least a couple of decades off. All of these trends were well established by the Seventies.

With the loss of the short story market and the consolidation of publishing, the economics of writing on spec became brutal. Writing and trying to sell a novel represents a tremendous investment of time and energy with little hope of success. By comparison writing on spec in the Forties meant coming up with twelve to fifteen pages then sending them off to twenty or so potential markets. The best of these markets paid good money; the worst were hungry for anything publishable.

The shift from short story to novel also meant greater risk for the publisher (and, though we don't normally think of it in these terms, for the reader who also invested money and time). A back-pages story that most readers skipped over might hurt the sales and reputation of a magazine slightly but as long as the featured stories were strong, the effect would be negligible. Novels though are free-standing and the novel gets that gets skipped over is the novel that goes unsold.

When Gold Medal signed John. D. MacDonald they knew were getting a skilled, prolific writer with a track record artistically and commercially successful short fiction. The same could be said about the signing of Donald Westlake, Lawrence Block, Joe Gores and many others. Publishing these first time authors was a remarkably low risk proposition.

Unfortunately for publishers today, there are no potential first time authors with those resumes. Publishers now have to roll the dice on inexperienced writers of unknown talent and productivity. In response to that change, they have taken various steps to mitigate the risk.

One response was the rise of the marketable blockbuster. The earliest example I can think of is the book Lace by Shirley Conran. If memory serves, Lace got a great deal of attention in the publishing world for Conran's huge advance, her lack of fiction-writing experience, and the role marketing played in the process. The general feeling was that the tagline ("Which one of you bitches is my mother? ") came first while the book itself was merely an afterthought.

More recently we have Dexter, a marketer's dream ("He's a serial killer who kills serial killers... It's torture porn you can feel good about!"). The author had a few books in his resume but nothing distinguished. The most notable was probably a collaboration with Star Trek actor Michael Dorn. The first book in the series, Darkly Dreaming Dexter was so poorly constructed that all of the principals had to act completely out of character to resolve the plot (tip for new authors: when a character casually overlooks her own attempted vivisection, it's time for a rewrite*).

The problems with the quality of the novel had no apparent effect on sales, nor did it prevent the character from appearing in a successful series of sequels and being picked up by Showtime (The TV show was handled by far more experienced writers who managed to seal up almost all of the plot holes).

The point here is not that Darkly Dreaming Dexter was a bad book or that publishing standards have declined. The point is that the economics have changed. Experienced fiction writers are more rare. Marketable concepts and franchises are more valuable, as is synergy with other media. The markets are smaller. There are fewer players. And much of the audience has a troublesome form of brand loyalty.

Normally of course brand loyalty is a plus, but books are an unusual case. If you convince a Coke drinker to also to drink Sprite you probably won't increase his overall soda consumption; you'll just have cannibalization. But readers who stick exclusively with one writer are severely underconsuming. Convince James Patterson readers to start reading Dean Koontz and you could double overall sales.

When most readers got their fiction either through magazines or by leafing through paperback racks, it was easy to introduce them to new writers. Now the situation is more difficult. One creative solution has been apostrophe series such as Tom Clancy's Op Center. Other people are credited with actually writing the books but the name above the title is there for branding purposes.

Which all leads us back to the original question: Why did thrillers become so dominant?

They tend to be easily marketable.

They are compatible with franchises.

They lend themselves to adaptation as big budget action movies.

Their somewhat impersonal style makes them suitable for ghosting or apostrophe branding.

They are, in short, they are what the market is looking for. As for me, I'm looking for the next reprint from Hard Case, but I might borrow the latest Turow after you're done with it.


* "Is that a spoiler?"
"No, sir. It was spoiled when I got here."

Wednesday, March 23, 2022

Twelve years ago at the blog -- part I

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

The Decline of the Middle (Creative) Class

I suggested in an earlier post that the rise to dominance of the thriller had not been accompanied by a rise in quality and reputation. In this and the next post, I'll try to put some foundations under this claim.

Popular art is driven by markets and shifts in popular art can always be traced back, at least partly, to economic, social and technological developments as well as changes in popular taste. The emergence of genre fiction followed the rise of the popular magazine (check here for more). Jazz hit its stride as the population started moving to cities. Talking pictures replaced silents when the technology made them possible.

Crime fiction, like science fiction first appeared in response to demand from general interest magazines like the Strand then moved into genre specific magazines like Black Mask and a few years later, cheap paperbacks. The demand for short stories was so great that even a successful author like Fitzgerald saw them as a lucrative alternative to novels. There was money to be made and that money brought in a lot of new writers.

It seems strange to say it now but for much of the Twentieth Century, it was possible to make a middle class living as a writer of short fiction. It wasn't easy; you had to write well and type fast enough to melt the keys but a surprisingly large number of people managed to do it.

Nor were writers the only example of the new creative middle class. According to Rosy McHargue (reported by music historian Brad Kay) in 1925 there were two hundred thousand professional musicians in the United States. Some were just scraping by, but many were making a good living. (keep in mind that many restaurants, most clubs and all theaters had at least one musician on the payroll.) Likewise, the large number of newspapers and independent publishers meant lots of work for graphic artists.

I don't want to wax too nostalgic for this era. Sturgeon's Law held firmly in place: 95% of what was published was crap. But it was the market for crap that made the system work. It provided the freelance equivalent of paid training -- writers could start at least partially supporting themselves while learning their craft, and it mitigated some of the risk of going into the profession -- even if you turned out not to be good enough you could still manage food and shelter while you were failing.

It was also a remarkably graduated system, one that rewarded quality while making room for the aforementioned crap. The better the stories the better the market and the higher the acceptance rate. In 1935, Robert E. Howard made over $2,000 strictly through magazine sales. Later, as the paperback market grew, writers at the very top like Ray Bradbury or John O'Hara would also see their stories collected in book form.

Starting with Gold Medal Books, paperback originals became a force in 1950. This did cut into the magazine market and hastened the demise of the pulps but it made it easier than ever before to become a novelist. It was more difficult (though still possible) to make a living simply by selling short stories, but easier to make the transition to longer and more lucrative works.

It was, in short, a beautifully functioning market with an almost ideal compensation system for a freelance based industry. It produced some exceptionally high quality products that have generated billions of dollars and continue to generate them in resales and adaptations (not to mention imitations and unlicensed remakes). This includes pretty much every piece of genre fiction you can think written before 1970.

The foundation of that system, the short story submarket, is essentially dead and the economics and business models of the rest of the publishing industry has changed radically leading to the rise of marketing, the blockbuster mentality and what I like to call the Slim Jim conundrum.

Tune in next time.

Tuesday, March 22, 2022

"The explainers I found were bad — boring, biased, inaccessible" and if they can do it, why can't I?


This is bad, but it's bad in an instructive way for anyone who would like to understand the coverage of crypto, NYT's credulous attitude toward tech trends, bothsidesing, and the career of Kevin Roose. 
It would probably take more than 14,000 words to go through all the problems with this. I'm trying to get Joseph in on the discussion, but even between the two of us, I doubt we can do a comprehensive job of it. For tonight, the best I can do is give you a quick tweet-level view. 

[Before we go on, the phrase "the casino is a trojan horse with a new financial system hidden inside” needs to be singled out for special praise.]


[When I said "Given enough time and money, there's no question something along these general lines would work," I meant a maglev vactrain. Musk's air-caster idea was so bad that all the "hyperloop" companies quietly dropped it immediately. Not a penny of those hundreds of millions of capital raised have been spent developing Musk's actual proposal. All they kept was the name.]   

"A balanced treatment of an unbalanced phenomenon distorts reality." — Norm Ornstein


Every good tech puff piece has to have a historical example of skeptics doubting some earlier revolutionary technology. These examples generally range from unrepresentative to complete bullshit. 

Here's a more thoughtful thread on this section.

Editors also love to see some hot strange bedfellows action, even if you have to fudge a few details.

Nor does the piece end on a strong note.


We have by no means mined out Roose's explainer -- everywhere you swing a pick, you're likely to hit paydirt -- and we seem to be less than halfway through the project.

Monday, March 21, 2022

Someone saw Double Indemnity and thought "what a great concept for a life insurance ad"


Sure, we've all thought it, but we didn't expect them to just come out and say it.




There's a long and very mixed history for edgy advertising. If done with a light touch it can be effective. Secret Weapon, until recently the company behind Jack in the Box's long running campaigns, was a master of hitting just the right balance.




Really edgy ad campaigns are often built around the theory that name recognition, particularly for a new company, is necessary and initially sufficient and the best way to achieve that is with an ad that gets everybody talking. Apple's "1984" was only tangentially related to the Macintosh PC, and yet it often routinely lands on lists of the best television commercials.

Of course, "1984" was in one sense highly traditional. It associated the product with positive things: freedom, self-expression, empowerment. What happens when a campaign focuses on nothing but making an impression?

We have at least one prominent example that debuted during the 1999 Superbowl. Anybody remember Outpost.com?




At least in this case, things didn't work out that well.


Friday, March 18, 2022

Weekend Web3 notes

First, Ben McKenzie gives an excellent interview on crypto from the very heart of the trendiness beast. 




Next is a conversation with a software and dev ops engineer named Geoffrey Huntley who has "stolen" all the NFTs available through the Ethereum and Solana blockchains. It's all part of a satirical art project to educate people about what NFTs are and, more importantly, are not. Coffeezilla is a YouTuber who specializes in uncovering get-rich-quick gurus who make up much of the advertising on the platform (including on his own channel because that's how the algorithm works).





The innate absurdity of stealing NFTs was also the subject of this Colbert sketch.






We'll let John Wick have the last word.



Thursday, March 17, 2022

Two alternatives to daylight saving time, one of which is just silly

First, from XKCD:



I come from a nocturnal family, so we had a strong preference for falling back over springing forward. My father insisted that after losing that hour, he never felt right till he got it back. If anything, I feel the same only stronger.

We currently have a system that's pretty good in the fall but which sucks in the spring, which raises the question, why not just keep the good part? If we gain an hour twice a month, we'll get twenty-four 49 hour weekends, we'll all be well-rested and at the end of the year, we'll be back where we started.

Who's with me? 


Wednesday, March 16, 2022

"The ultimate distillation of the golden age of fraud"

If you're new to Web3 and the hype economy in general (a phrase I apparently no longer have exclusive rights to) this New Republic overview by Ben McKenzie, Jacob Silverman is a good place to start.

In the golden age of fraud, grift sits comfortably alongside the general sense of unreality permeating the American economy. JPEGs sell for millions of dollars and are denominated as a new asset class, despite the many practical and philosophical problems accompanying them. Ephemeral meme stocks and dog-themed crypto tokens outperform deep-pocketed companies that actually, you know, make things. The world’s richest man, Elon Musk, owes his fortune to a state-subsidized electric car company that produces far fewer vehicles than his competitors but is worth more than almost all of them put together. (Although it must be said that Musk’s rivals often aren’t much better: Volkswagen, the number-two car company in the world by revenue, cooked the books for years by rigging emission-detection software.)

...

The cryptocurrency industry may be the ultimate distillation of the golden age of fraud. Like Uber, it’s benefited from vast sums of cheap investment capital and pliant public officials easily charmed by new technologies. But whereas Uber provides a clear service, albeit at the expense of underpaid gig workers, the use cases for crypto remain uncertain, even as it drapes itself in utopian rhetoric about financial revolution. Wild volatility, a lack of payments infrastructure, rampant scams, and technical complexity make crypto an unappealing choice to be a real currency or store of value. And its environmental impact and Ponzi-like economics—new investors are required to buy out the old—mean that it may actually be a negative-sum game.

In a hype economy built on froth, virality, misinformation, and celebrity endorsements, crypto has no apparent utility besides being a source of risky speculation. As economists from both the left (KrugmanRoubini) and right (Hanke) have pointed out, crypto has no inherent value except what another person might pay for it. In economics, this is referred to as the “greater fool” theory. At its base, crypto is private money (an outdated notion from the nineteenth century) that largely runs on rails purposefully set up to be outside the banking system and away from those pesky government authorities with their annoying focus on transparency and the rule of law. Its value is a collective hallucination, dependent on constant salesmanship and, in some cases, deception and market manipulation.

Tuesday, March 15, 2022

Tuesday Tweets

I'm amazed/appalled at how little attention these stories are generating. It's almost as if the interest of journalists is inversely proportionate to the level of extremism.






Musk: unhinged tweeting at... 12:48 AM... 1:31 AM... 4:09 AM...





You know you're a true believer when you brag about how easy it is to repo your car.









You'll be surprised to learn that people who shop at the Beverly Center aren't all that price sensitive.




Of course that's what you'd expect from liberals like Boehlert and the... uh... Wall Street Journal.



Accusations that a political party is in the pocket of a foreign power have historically been the go-to examples of a witch hunt, but in this remake of the Crucible, the case against the witches is actually pretty convincing.














Marshall makes THE essential point about Putin's show of weakness in Ukraine.
More here.










Misc.










Monday, March 14, 2022

Twelve years ago at the blog -- did not expect to run across Trump

He's only tangentially related to the topic of the post, but his appearance does give this a slightly unnerving quality you want in a Monday post.  

The actual topic of the following is brands and how to value them. A couple of the references have aged badly (does anyone even remember John Edwards?). On the whole though, I think it holds up. Apple is still Apple. Clorox is still Clorox. And Trump still has unconvincing hair. 

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Comparing Apples and Really Bad Toupees

DISCLAIMER: Though I have worked in some related areas like product launches, I have never done an analysis of brand value. What follows are a few thoughts about branding without any claim of special expertise or insight. If I've gotten something wrong here I would appreciate any notes or corrections.

Joseph's post reminded me of this article in the Wall Street Journal about the dispute between Donald Trump and Carl Icahn over the value of the Trump brand. Trump, not surprisingly, favors the high end:
In court Thursday, Mr. Trump boasted that his brand was recently valued by an outside appraiser at $3 billion.

In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Trump dismissed the idea that financial troubles had tarnished his casino brand. He also dismissed Mr. Icahn's claims that the Trump gaming brand was damaged, pointing to a recent filing in which Mr. Icahn made clear that he wants to assume the license to the brand. "Every building in Atlantic City is in trouble. OK? This isn't unique to Trump," he said. "Everybody wants the brand, including Carl. It's the hottest brand in the country."
While Icahn's estimate is a bit lower:
Mr. Icahn, however, believes his group also would have the right to use the Trump name under an existing licensing deal, but says the success of the casinos don't hinge on that. The main disadvantage to losing the name, he says, would be the $15 million to $20 million cost of changing the casinos' signs.
So we can probably put the value of the Trump brand somewhere in the following range:

-15,000,000 < TRUMP < 3,000,000,000

(the second inequality should be less than or equal to -- not sure how to do it on this text editor)

Neither party here is what you'd call trustworthy and both are clearly pulling the numbers they want out of appropriate places but they are able to make these claims with straight faces partly because of the nature of the problem.

Assigning a value to a brand can be a tricky thing. Let's reduce this to pretty much the simplest possible case and talk about the price differential between your product and a similar house brand. If you make Clorox, we're in pretty good shape. There may be some subtle difference in the quality between your product and, say, the Target store brand but it's probably safe to ignore it and ascribe the extra dollar consumers pay for your product to the effect.

But what about a product like Apple Computers? There's clearly a brand effect at work but in order to measure the price differential we have to decide what products to compare them to. If we simply look at specs the brand effect is huge but Apple users would be quick to argue that they were also paying for high quality, stylish design and friendly interfaces. People certainly pay more for Macs, Ipods, Iphones, and the rest, but how much of that extra money is for features and how much is for brand?

(full disclosure: I use a PC with a dual Vista/Ubuntu operating system. I do my programming [Python, Octave] and analysis [R] in Ubuntu and keep Vista for compatibility issues. I'm very happy with my system. If an Apple user would like equal time we'd be glad to oblige)

I suspect that more products are closer to the Apple end of this spectrum than the Clorox end but even with things like bleach, all we have is a snapshot of a single product. To useful we need to estimate the long term value of the brand. Is it a Zima (assuming Zima was briefly a valuable brand) or is it a Kellogg's Corn Flakes? And we would generally want a brand that could include multiple brands. How do we measure the impact of a brand on products we haven't launched yet? (This last point is particularly relevant for Apple.)

The short answer is you take smart people, give them some precedents and some guidelines then let them make lots of educated guesses and hope they aren't gaming the system to tell you what you want to hear.

It is an extraordinarily easy system to game even with guidelines. In the case of Trump's casinos we have three resorts, each with its own brand that interacts in an unknown and unknowable way with the Trump brand. If you removed Trump's name from these buildings, how would it affect the number of people who visit or the amount they spend?

If we were talking about Holiday Inn or even Harrah's, we could do a pretty good job estimating the effect of changing the name over the door. We would still have to make some assumptions but we would have data to back them up. With Trump, all we would have is assumption-based assumptions. If you take these assumptions about the economy, trends in gambling and luxury spending, the role of Trump's brand and where it's headed, and you give each one of them a small, reasonable, completely defensible nudge in the right direction, it is easy to change your estimates by one or two orders of magnitude.

We also have an unusual, possibly even unique, range of data problem. Many companies have tried to build a brand on a public persona, sometimes quite successfully. Normally a sharp business analyst would be in a good position to estimate the value of one of these brands and answer questions like "if Wayne Gretsky were to remove his name from this winter resort, what impact would it have?"

The trouble with Trump is that almost no one likes him, at least according to his Q score. Most persona-based brands are built upon people who were at some point well-liked and Q score is one of the standard metrics analysts use when looking at those brands. Until we get some start-ups involving John Edwards and Tiger Woods, Mr. Trump may well be outside of the range of our data.

Friday, March 11, 2022

I'm not recommending this SNL clip because it's funny. In a sense, I'm recommending it because it's not.

Yes, I know. Complaining that Saturday Night Live isn't funny anymore has been a cliche for longer than most of the cast members have been alive, but that's not really where I'm going with this. For one thing, it's not a question of anymore. The show never was consistently amusing or even interesting. That was never the point.

For a few years back in the 70s, Saturday Night Live did hit a very sweet spot, being on the intersection of the conceptual comedy movement of people like Steve Martin and Andy Kaufman on one side and the rise of the Second City school of sketch comedy on the other. It also benefitted from an early association with talents like George Carlin, Richard Pryor and Buck Henry.

Lorne Michaels’ initial idea was to rip off National Lampoon's stage and radio shows keeping much of the cast and many of the writers. The material was toned down for television (including adding the Muppets to the original line-up), but it was clearly an unlicensed Lampoon TV show. That initial concept burned itself out fairly quickly and was definitely showing its age even before the 1980 reboot, which more or less introduced the current incarnation of the show.

SNL has been an institution for most of its run, and as a rule, intentionally funny institutions are rare. It's true that lots of incredibly talented people have worked for there, both in front of and behind the camera (Michaels has a good eye) and they do hit paydirt now and then, but that's not really what the show's about. 

Almost since its inception, people watched SNL so they could talk about what other people were talking about, and since at least second or third season, the producers have built the show around this. In addition to catchphrases and recurring characters who often didn't need to recur, this has led to increasing reliance on topical sketches that check off familiar figures and events, where the laughs come less from the jokes and more from the sense of recognition.

Sketches like this.



This follows a very old tradition. Don jr. rubbing his nose and looking for a bathroom with a mirrored countertop is the 2022 version of the famously drunk character walking out with an ice pack on his head. 

We've talked before about how bad art can often be more useful than great art.  Someone like Shakespeare will see things that their contemporaries miss which pretty much by definition makes she or he unrepresentative.

This sketch by comparison is the exact opposite, bad but representative of its moment. Some talented performers manage a few real laughs, but on the whole, it's just a bunch of walk-ons close-captioned for the comically impaired. The jokes are simply characters saying out loud obvious things about themselves: 

Fox News has been pushing Russian propaganda about Ukraine and is now desperately trying to backpedal since the position has become toxic;

Tucker Carlson is a smug, preppie racist;

Trump is a babbling idiot;

Fox viewers are old;

And so on.

There's no real imagination here, just a checklist of people and incidents associated with conservative media and the war in Ukraine, but it is that very lack of imagination that makes this useful. The writers made a list of things that they believed their audience would recognize and agree with. They seem to have been successful. The cold open without anything to recommend it other than the topic has gotten buzz, write-ups and over three million views on YouTube.

There is, of course, the bigger question of to what extent we can generalize from the SNL audience to the wider population, but that's a conversation that requires a different set of tools. 

Thursday, March 10, 2022

Not merely a villain but also a fool

Excellent essay by Cory Doctorow on how (and how not to) break up tech giants like Google and the walking anti-trust violation formerly known as Facebook. The opening passage fits nicely with our long-running tech messiah thread.

Science fiction has a longstanding love-hate relationship with the tech tycoon. The literature is full of billionaire inventors, sometimes painted as system-bucking heroes, at other times as megalomanical supervillains.

From time to time, we even manage to portray one of these people in a way that hews most closely to reality: ordinary mediocrities, no better than you or I, whose success comes down to a combination of luck and a willingness to set aside consideration of the needs of others. It’s easy to find such people atop our increasingly steep economic pyramid, but it’s very hard to find any who’ll admit it. There is nothing a successful person hates more than being reminded that “meritocracy” is a self-serving myth, a circular logic that says, “The system puts the best people in charge, and I am in charge, therefore I am the best.”

But while the powerful remain blissfully insulated from the bursting of the meritocratic delusion, public sentiment is increasingly turning against the ultra-wealthy, and in the most interesting way possible. Today, the commercial tyrant isn’t merely seen as a villain, but also as a fool – someone whose greatness is due to an accident of history and a vacancy of mor­als, not the result of a powerful genius gone awry.

It’s a distinction with a difference. If Facebook is Facebook because Mark Zuckerberg is a once-in-a-millennium genius who did what no other could, then our best hope is to somehow gentle the Zuck, bring him into public service, like a caged ET that govern­ment scientists either bribe or torment into working on behalf of the human race. That’s the constitutional monarchy model, the model where we continue to acknowledge the divine right of kings, but bind them to the material plane by draping the king in golden chains of office whose ends are held by an aristocracy that keeps the monarch from getting too frisky.

But if Facebook is Facebook because Zuck got lucky, if he just combined cheap capital with regulatory tolerance for buying out the competition and building a legally impregnable walled garden around his users, then we don’t need Zuck or Facebook. There’s plenty more where he came from, and all we need to do is withdraw the privileges that regulatory forbearance granted him. That’s the republic model, where we get rid of the king and govern ourselves.

Wednesday, March 9, 2022

"Love Me, I'm a Liberal"

A couple of threads converged to remind me of this. First, I've been thinking about the relationships between the young revolutionaries of the sixties and the insurrectionists of today (and, given the typical age of Fox viewers, wondering how much of an overlap there is).

Second, the war in Ukraine and the various Russian scandals that came before it have highlighted longstanding rifts between liberals and the anti-anti-Trump left. This is part of a tradition that goes back to the split over war with Germany in the late thirties and the tankies of the fifties and sixties. 

Phil Ochs' "Love Me, I'm a Liberal" is one of the best and wittiest examples of sixties radical disgust with those just to the right. You can find complete annotated lyrics here, though the song is better listened to than read.




Excerpts:

Intro
In every American community, you have varying shades of political opinion. One of the shadiest of these is the liberals. An outspoken group on many subjects. Ten degrees to the left of center in good times, ten degrees to the right of center if it affects them personally. So here, then, is a lesson in safe logic. 

...

I cheered when Humphrey was chosen
My faith in the system restored
I'm glad that the Commies were thrown out
Of the A.F.L. C.I.O. board
And I love Puerto Ricans and Negros
As long as they don't move next door
So love me, love me, love me, I'm a liberal


Ah, the people of old Mississippi
Should all hang their heads in shame
Now, I can't understand how their minds work
What's the matter don't they watch Les Crane?
But if you ask me to bus my children
I hope the cops take down your name
So love me, love me, love me, I'm a liberal

...

Sure, once I was young and impulsive
I wore every conceivable pin
Even went to socialist meetings
Learned all the old union hymns
Ah, but I've grown older and wiser
And that's why I'm turning you in
So love me, love me, love me, I'm a liberal


That last verse would prove to be prescient. Ochs' generation turned out to be far less committed to these causes than their parents were. He never saw his radical peers become reactionaries. He killed himself in 1976.

Tuesday, March 8, 2022

Five years ago at the blog -- the Watergate debt



Monday, March 13, 2017

The Washington Press Corps and the "Watergate debt"

I don't want to exaggerate the magnitude of this, but I have come around to the notion that one of the factors, albeit perhaps a small one, that helps explain the bizarre behavior of mainstream journalists toward Republican scandal over the past quarter century is the sense that the press corps owes one to the GOP after Watergate.

The scandal was the one instance in American history where a president was forced to resign and investigative journalism was arguably the main driver. The press aggressively pursued the story and the coverage was, at the very least, sometimes colored by the personal dislike that many journalists felt toward Nixon.

As the years passed and the former president (deservedly or not) managed to rehabilitate some of his reputation, the idea seemed to take root in the press corps that they needed to balance the scales. The idea was nurtured by the Republicans and conservative media but I don't believe it was planted by them. Like its sister belief, the biased liberal media theory, it was an idea born of and trapped in the 70s.

The Iran Contra scandal was both symptom and aggravating factor.  There were hesitation marks all over the reporting, and while some of these can be attributed to the extraordinary popularity and charisma of Ronald Reagan, the timidity of the press is still notable. Nonetheless, despite the relatively gentle handling, it was still another case of journalists pursuing a Republican scandal.

By comparison, the election of Bill Clinton seemed to represent an almost perfect opportunity to balance things out. Not only was Clinton a Democrat, he also was an outsider (which threatened the livelihood of veteran reporters whose status rested on their DC Rolodexes) and a Southern boy from the wrong side of the tracks (which played on deep-seated regional and, more importantly, class prejudices).

I was in or around Arkansas through the 90s and I remember a constant sense of amazement. Perhaps it was just my naivety, but I was completely unprepared for how low supposedly respectable journalists were willing to go once they'd committed to a narrative, even if it meant crawling in bed with the remnants of the state's  segregationist movement (I still remember my revulsion seeing the Washington press corps elevate Jim Johnson to elder statesman).

I've argued before that the bad journalism that took root during Whitewater was a contributing factor and possibly necessary condition for the Bush presidency, the build-up to Iraq, and a general undermining of democracy that culminated with the election of Donald Trump. It would be ironicc if misplaced guilt over great journalism helped contribute to the decline of the profession.

For related oints, check out thee following from Charles Pierce and Frontline.

Monday, March 7, 2022

"You say you want a revolution"

This was going to be part of an upcoming post but I decided it worked better freestanding. 

Back in the late sixties there was a surprising popular genre of apocalyptic dystopias inspired by fears of the youth movement. Countless examples in episodic television (three or four from Star Trek alone). The 1967 novel Logan’s Run (but not the 1976 movie which dropped the political aspects of the story). Arguably films If and Clockwork Orange (though in this case, not the book, which is more a part of the post-war panic over juvenile delinquency). Corman’s Gas-s-s-s. Certainly others I’m forgetting. 

Though not the best in the bunch, the most representative was Wild in the Streets.





Wild in the Streets figures prominently in Pauline Kael's essay "Trash, Art, and the Movies": [emphasis added]

There is so much talk now about the art of the film that we may be in danger of forgetting that most of the movies we enjoy are not works of art. The Scalphunters, for example, was one of the few entertaining American movies this past year, but skillful though it was, one could hardly call it a work of art — if such terms are to have any useful meaning. Or, to take a really gross example, a movie that is as crudely made as Wild in the Streets — slammed together with spit and hysteria and opportunism — can nevertheless be enjoyable, though it is almost a classic example of an unartistic movie. What makes these movies — that are not works of art — enjoyable? The Scalphunters was more entertaining than most Westerns largely because Burt Lancaster and Ossie Davis were peculiarly funny together; part of the pleasure of the movie was trying to figure out what made them so funny. Burt Lancaster is an odd kind of comedian: what’s distinctive about him is that his comedy seems to come out of his physicality. In serious roles an undistinguished and too obviously hard-working actor, he has an apparently effortless flair for comedy and nothing is more infectious than an actor who can relax in front of the camera as if he were having a good time. (George Segal sometimes seems to have this gift of a wonderful amiability, and Brigitte Bardot was radiant with it in Viva Maria!) Somehow the alchemy of personality in the pairing of Lancaster and Ossie Davis — another powerfully funny actor of tremendous physical presence — worked, and the director Sydney Pollack kept tight control so that it wasn’t overdone.

And Wild in the Streets? It’s a blatantly crummy-looking picture, but that somehow works for it instead of against it because it’s smart in a lot of ways that better-made pictures aren’t. It looks like other recent products from American International Pictures but it’s as if one were reading a comic strip that looked just like the strip of the day before, and yet on this new one there are surprising expressions on the faces and some of the balloons are really witty. There’s not a trace of sensitivity in the drawing or in the ideas, and there’s something rather specially funny about wit without any grace at all; it can be enjoyed in a particularly crude way — as Pop wit. The basic idea is corny — It Can’t Happen Here with the freaked-out young as a new breed of fascists — but it’s treated in the paranoid style of editorials about youth (it even begins by blaming everything on the parents). And a cheap idea that is this current and widespread has an almost lunatic charm, a nightmare gaiety. There’s a relish that people have for the idea of drug-taking kids as monsters threatening them — the daily papers merging into Village of the Damned. Tapping and exploiting this kind of hysteria for a satirical fantasy, the writer Robert Thom has used what is available and obvious but he’s done it with just enough mockery and style to make it funny. He throws in touches of characterization and occasional lines that are not there just to further the plot, and these throwaways make odd connections so that the movie becomes almost frolicsome in its paranoia (and in its delight in its own cleverness).

It's easy to be dismissive of these fears fifty plus years later, but the revolutionary rhetoric of the movement was often extreme and was punctuated by the occasional bombing, bank robbery, etc.

But probably the biggest mistake people made when predicting the impact of the sixties youth movement was taking them at their word, believing that their commitment to radicalism (or even liberalism) would outlast the end of the Vietnam War. The post-war generation would change the country, but I doubt anyone in 1969 would have guessed how. 


Friday, March 4, 2022

Horrible Children

I've been thinking a lot about infantilism and the alt-right, particularly the possibility that being immersed in that world might cause or at least contribute to the strange, childish behavior we've been seeing. It's a thesis one is reluctant to bring up for a number of reasons: it's dismissive and needlessly insulting; it frees one from the need to address other positions or understand where they come from; it seldom leads anywhere productive. 

Sometimes, though, a possibility becomes so unavoidable that ignoring it becomes an act of dishonesty.  We have grown men throwing literal tantrums over wearing a mask. We have Lauren Boebert and Marjorie Taylor Greene acting like spoiled twelve-year-olds at the State of the Union. We have Donald Trump.



This is not normal. The outbursts. The pouting. The contrariness. The substitution of "own the libs" attention getting devices for a political view.

And, yes, we can find examples in both parties, but in no way can this be considered symmetrical.
 
Bob Chipman has been thinking along related lines. Chipman is, as previously mentioned, one of our best critics/cultural commentators. Here he uses JoJo Rabbit as a stepping off point to explore the strangely childish quality of the Nazis. He even takes the connection between infantilism and Nazism further by bringing in a comparison to certain extreme reactionary segments of fan boy culture.