This is Joseph.
There was a lot of confusion on this post. This was my lack of recent writing practice. So the sequence was:
~2010: Truckers have flexibility and ~$50 K salary
Micro-monitoring is introduced to improve efficiency
~2015: Truckers have constant monitoring, no flexibility, and a $50K salary
It's also the case that any monitoring system will, because it is based on general rules, be incorrect for a lot of specific situations. For example, sitting in a traffic jam instead of having a longer rest break and then driving later (because the breaks are timed).
Now the reason for monitoring is mostly about increasing productivity (safety improvements are also a form of productivity increase). Either the system improves profits or it doesn't. If it doesn't improve profits enough to increase salaries then maybe it is a bad idea? If it is possible to increase salaries with the higher efficiency, then why is it so hard to consider sharing the benefits of increased productivity? In particular, why is reducing the training requirements of the workers the path to increased safety?
Mark pointed out that we are seeing the same thing with UPS drivers.
Increasing productivity is good but so are working conditions. If there are huge gains made from this type of monitoring (like one sees in a call center) then it only makes sense to share these with the workers, who will then be able to see the monitoring as a source of higher wages. You can imagine the "make $60 K with monitoring" versus "make 50K without" being a great way to make people decide they are willing to put up with the hassle of being tracked by devices that can't always convey complete information.
Comments, observations and thoughts from two bloggers on applied statistics, higher education and epidemiology. Joseph is an associate professor. Mark is a professional statistician and former math teacher.
Friday, August 7, 2015
Thursday, August 6, 2015
Retirement age
I missed this issue when it was raised about a month ago but it is a rather good point:
What I think I really want to see is some sort of evidence that the existence of retirement programs hurts national productivity in an important way. What is the alternative? Can people really work into their late sixties and early seventies across a wide range of professions?
Plus, these programs allow us to have experiments in other programs -- like a 401(k) plan -- without leaving people destitute if they prove to be bad policy. In this sense, social security acts as a sort of innovation insurance, to allow us to try and improve retirement programs. That seems like a feature to me.
Raising the retirement age is a strange prescription for countries suffering from mass youth unemployment. When I made that observation on twitter the other day, I got a lot of pushback from people accusing me of a "lump of labor" fallacy. But please note, I didn't say that countries suffering from mass youth unemployment should lower the retirement age. What I said is that if you have a country -- Greece, say, or France -- where youth unemployment is very high, it's strange to decide that raising the retirement age is the cure for your economic woes.I am also always a touch mystified as to why this policy prescription is quite so popular to deal with actual economic crises. It is not that you cannot set the retirement age too low (you sure can), but that it does seem counter-productive to always seek to increase it when there is a shortfall in demand and high unemployment. Does it make sense to pump out money to people who can spend it (retirees) and generate new employment among the young (who produce services to the retirees).
What I think I really want to see is some sort of evidence that the existence of retirement programs hurts national productivity in an important way. What is the alternative? Can people really work into their late sixties and early seventies across a wide range of professions?
Plus, these programs allow us to have experiments in other programs -- like a 401(k) plan -- without leaving people destitute if they prove to be bad policy. In this sense, social security acts as a sort of innovation insurance, to allow us to try and improve retirement programs. That seems like a feature to me.
Parking requirements
This is Joseph.
Okay, I read this article on Mike the Mad Biologist's site and I wanted to comment because I think the author is completely missing the implications of the piece. Consider:
Because on street parking is free. Drive around Fremont and try to park. I dare you. Especially on an evening or weekend. I avoid things I really like in Fremont because bus service is terrible and it's simply impossible to park. Side streets tend to be three cars wide -- you can end up facing another car with no room to go around because both sides of the street are completely full of cars. Driveways are often blocked (another reason one might not want to pay money to have one). If many people pay > 30% of their salary on rent they may be economizing by trying not to have to pay for a parking stall.
Now Seattle wants to increase density. But the state of Washington keeps cutting public transportation. So how are people supposed to get around? Biking is a nice idea, but the weather isn't always that good and many people may be elderly or disabled. It is scary to be on a Seattle bike trail if you are not a fast rider.
The real reason that costs are suddenly rising is a not a policy that has been in place since the 1950's. It is that more people are moving to Seattle, often for well-paying jobs, and increasing the demand for housing. This isn't a complicated issue. Now, how one handles it might be. But I would suggest that the place to start is figuring out a sensible transit policy. But Seattle is the fastest growing city in the United States -- does it not make sense to decide how we are going to handle transit. I would love more bike lanes (which, to be fair, is happening) and better transit services. But I want to see a plausible way for this to happen (given it is the state that keeps cutting public transit) before I think that we should make the parking issues worse!
As for bike lanes, the current city trick to make them work is to get rid of the on-street parking (to make it two lanes, a turn lane, and two bike lanes). One might suspect that simply doing more of this (and making biking safer) could well lead to fewer unrented stalls.
It is not that I think that parking requirements, as is, are necessarily optimal. But it is worth thinking about these issues.
Okay, I read this article on Mike the Mad Biologist's site and I wanted to comment because I think the author is completely missing the implications of the piece. Consider:
But at Velo Apartments—a new, 171-unit, fully leased building located at 3635 Woodland Park Avenue North in Seattle's Fremont area—just 100 out of 128 parking stalls have been rented, according to Rob Hackleman, associate development and asset manager for Mack Urban, which developed the building. Using the estimated $20,000-to-$50,000 per-stall calculation, that's about $560,000 to $1.4 million worth of unnecessary parking spaces. Ironically, Velo Apartments is marketed as "bike-friendly," with "bike-focused amenities" and close access to the Burke-Gilman Trail. The development's logo includes an old-fashioned bicycle, and its website states, "Your Ride Starts Here." Hackleman said five unused parking stalls were converted to create more bike storage because the existing bike storage wasn't enough to meet demand.I work in Seattle with a lot of young professionals. Many of them bike commute. I struggle to find any without cars. My wife and I share a single car. This is actually the most common pattern among those with low rates of car ownership. So why are stalls going unsold?
Because on street parking is free. Drive around Fremont and try to park. I dare you. Especially on an evening or weekend. I avoid things I really like in Fremont because bus service is terrible and it's simply impossible to park. Side streets tend to be three cars wide -- you can end up facing another car with no room to go around because both sides of the street are completely full of cars. Driveways are often blocked (another reason one might not want to pay money to have one). If many people pay > 30% of their salary on rent they may be economizing by trying not to have to pay for a parking stall.
Now Seattle wants to increase density. But the state of Washington keeps cutting public transportation. So how are people supposed to get around? Biking is a nice idea, but the weather isn't always that good and many people may be elderly or disabled. It is scary to be on a Seattle bike trail if you are not a fast rider.
The real reason that costs are suddenly rising is a not a policy that has been in place since the 1950's. It is that more people are moving to Seattle, often for well-paying jobs, and increasing the demand for housing. This isn't a complicated issue. Now, how one handles it might be. But I would suggest that the place to start is figuring out a sensible transit policy. But Seattle is the fastest growing city in the United States -- does it not make sense to decide how we are going to handle transit. I would love more bike lanes (which, to be fair, is happening) and better transit services. But I want to see a plausible way for this to happen (given it is the state that keeps cutting public transit) before I think that we should make the parking issues worse!
As for bike lanes, the current city trick to make them work is to get rid of the on-street parking (to make it two lanes, a turn lane, and two bike lanes). One might suspect that simply doing more of this (and making biking safer) could well lead to fewer unrented stalls.
It is not that I think that parking requirements, as is, are necessarily optimal. But it is worth thinking about these issues.
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
Growth fetishists are an optimistic lot
The other day Marketplace did a long segment on investors' obsession with growth in the tech sector. It was well done and more balanced than most reporting in the area (financial journalists tend to get very starry-eyed on the subject), but the show's best quote on the topic was buried deep in an entirely different piece.
In the murky world of investing, this is the closest you will get to a clear boundary. Senior management has publicly committed to it repeatedly and it is baked into the business model, but analysts have gotten so good at creating these wishful thinking feedback loops that even
CEO of the company in question can't disrupt the flow.
This growth shows no signs of slowing. This year Shake Shack made its initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange and was valued at $21 per share. That number has tripled since then, with even higher peaks in the interim. The company says it plans to build only 450 locations, but investors are already predicting bigger expansion.I really wish I had a transcript of the interview -- this summary doesn't capture the disconnect that comes through in the actual conversation -- but you can still see the problem here. The CEO (who comes off as quite sharp in the interview) says they have a hard limit on growth because expanding too quickly would severely damage the brand.
In the murky world of investing, this is the closest you will get to a clear boundary. Senior management has publicly committed to it repeatedly and it is baked into the business model, but analysts have gotten so good at creating these wishful thinking feedback loops that even
CEO of the company in question can't disrupt the flow.
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
Harsh Discipline and No-excuse Charters continued
[I posted this at the teaching blog a few months ago, but it's a natural follow-up to the previous post on harsh discipline.]
When discipline crosses the line
I've been meaning to write this up for a while now, but recent news about attrition (see here and here for the conversation up to now) has brought the issue back to the forefront.
When you take a close at the increasingly dominant charter model (the "no-excuses" school) and some of the highly touted success stories (such as the KIPP schools), you will soon notice how extreme some of the discipline can be.
The first is how rough, even traumatic, this and other policies of the get-tough, "no excuses" schools can be. There are kids who thrive in highly structured and disciplined environments, but there are many others who respond with varying degrees of anxiety, depression and/or anger. Then, to add injury to injury, this psychological toll is matched with an educational one. These kids are denied instruction through suspensions then forced out and sent to other generally underfunded schools, often in the middle of the year, a practice which maximizes the disruption and minimizes the chance to learn.
The second is the way the incentive system of the reform movement encourages these often brutal policies. They are an extraordinarily effective way of getting rid of kids whom you can't handle or who put a drain on you resources. The result is that the very thing that traumatizes these children produces promotions for administrators and funding increases for their schools.
When discipline crosses the line
I've been meaning to write this up for a while now, but recent news about attrition (see here and here for the conversation up to now) has brought the issue back to the forefront.
When you take a close at the increasingly dominant charter model (the "no-excuses" school) and some of the highly touted success stories (such as the KIPP schools), you will soon notice how extreme some of the discipline can be.
A tiny padded room at KIPP Star Washington Heights Elementary School was a real-life nightmare for two young boys who were repeatedly detained in the tot cells, the Daily News has learned.There are two points that cannot be overemphasized here.
The students, who were enrolled in kindergarten and first grade at the highly regarded charter school, were both removed by their parents in the past two weeks after they suffered anxiety attacks as a result of their confinement.
“He was crying hysterically,” said Teneka Hall, 28, a full-time Washington Heights mom whose son, Xavier, was rushed to the hospital after he panicked and wet himself while he was holed up in the padded room. “It’s no way to treat a child.”
The school’s so-called “calm-down” room is small, about the size of a walk-in closet, said Hall, who visited it with her son at the start of the school year. It’s empty, but for a soft mat lining the floor and a single light on the ceiling.
The room’s only window is an approximately 2-foot by 3-foot panel in the single door. It’s partially covered so staffers can look inside, but children cannot. Students were placed in the room, alone, for 15 to 20 minutes at a stretch, their parents said.State law requires that children placed in a time-out setting be in a space where they can be seen and heard “continuously,” but it does not require adults to be in the room where children are stashed.
When 5-year-old Xavier was confined to the room on Dec. 3, he suffered an anxiety attack so severe that staffers called for emergency workers to take him to the hospital.
“I was scared,” said Xavier, who was taken to New York Presbyterian and released to his mom, who pulled him from the charter and enrolled him in another school immediately.
The first is how rough, even traumatic, this and other policies of the get-tough, "no excuses" schools can be. There are kids who thrive in highly structured and disciplined environments, but there are many others who respond with varying degrees of anxiety, depression and/or anger. Then, to add injury to injury, this psychological toll is matched with an educational one. These kids are denied instruction through suspensions then forced out and sent to other generally underfunded schools, often in the middle of the year, a practice which maximizes the disruption and minimizes the chance to learn.
The second is the way the incentive system of the reform movement encourages these often brutal policies. They are an extraordinarily effective way of getting rid of kids whom you can't handle or who put a drain on you resources. The result is that the very thing that traumatizes these children produces promotions for administrators and funding increases for their schools.
Monday, August 3, 2015
Harsh Discipline and No-excuse Charters
One of the disconnects I've noticed between educators and many education researchers (particularly those who come from outside of the field) is that the educators tend to have a more complex, multivariate view of student outcomes, while the researchers are often prone to a particularly severe form of the tyranny of measurement where they ignore not only the difficult-to-measure but also the easy-to-measure if it isn't part of their small set of approved metrics.
Emotional damage is notoriously difficult to quantify, but we should all be able to agree that needlessly traumatizing students is a bad thing. Unfortunately, under the current system, the consequences of excessively harsh discipline basically serve as externalities. The schools reap numerous benefits while the kids pay the costs.
Just how big is the externality?
From the Boston Globe:
From the Chicago Tribune:
From Chalkbeat
Emotional damage is notoriously difficult to quantify, but we should all be able to agree that needlessly traumatizing students is a bad thing. Unfortunately, under the current system, the consequences of excessively harsh discipline basically serve as externalities. The schools reap numerous benefits while the kids pay the costs.
Just how big is the externality?
From the Boston Globe:
Boston charter schools are far more likely than traditional school systems to suspend students, usually for minor infractions such as violating dress codes or being disrespectful, a high-risk disciplinary action that could cause students to disengage from their classes, according to a report released Tuesday.
Of the 10 school systems in Massachusetts with the highest out-of-school suspension rates, all but one were charter schools and nearly all of them were in Boston, according to the report, which examined the rates for the 2012-2013 school year. The report was released by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, a nonpartisan legal organization in Boston.
From the Chicago Tribune:
As it continues to modify strict disciplinary policies in an effort to keep students in the classroom, Chicago Public Schools on Tuesday released data showing privately run charter schools expel students at a vastly higher rate than the rest of the district.
The data reveal that during the last school year, 307 students were kicked out of charter schools, which have a total enrollment of about 50,000. In district-run schools, there were 182 kids expelled out of a student body of more than 353,000.
From Chalkbeat
New York City charter schools suspended students at almost three times the rate of traditional public schools during the 2011-12 school year, according to a Chalkbeat analysis, though some charter schools have since begun to reduce the use of suspensions for minor infractions.
Overall, charter schools suspended at least 11 percent of their students that year, while district schools suspended 4.2 percent of their students. The charter-school suspension rate is likely an underestimate because charter schools don’t have to report suspensions that students serve in school.
Not all schools had high suspension rates. One-third of charter schools reported suspending fewer than 5 percent of their students, and many schools said they did not give out any out-of-school suspensions. But 11 charter schools suspended more than 30 percent of their students — a figure likely to draw added scrutiny amid a nationwide push to reduce suspensions and a debate over allowing more charter schools to open statewide.
Friday, July 31, 2015
Supply and demand
This is Joseph
I'm often talking about how direct supply and demand relations seem to have broken with respect to managerial salaries (why aren't we outsourcing CEOs to India?). In these cases, I am often skeptical that the high wages paid to senior managers are really required to attract a competent candidate. But Cathy O'Neil points out that this issue is happening in reverse with entry level workers, where raising wages is seen as a taboo:
In the comments we also have:
It is remarkable that companies are acting like this and not addressing shortages with wages. It makes me suspect that there is some sort of "moral virtue" in paying workers less (or a political point about not wanting to pay people). Part of it is likely the "something for nothing" game -- if you don't count the costs of your new system on employee retention/morale then it looks like free productivity gains. Since people are "sticky" (it takes time to find a new job and the employees may hope that the bad plan will go away), there is a lag between the implementation and the subsequent HR issues.
The proposed solution to reduce the criterion for licenses is a short term fix that won't hold in the long run. A sufficiently bad job (high stress, low autonomy, moderate pay, much travel) is simply going to have to pay more to be competitive. If you don't believe me, double wages and see what happens.
However, the big point I want to make is that is appears that these companies don't seem to believe in the market economy, except when it is helpful to them. Otherwise they would respond to changes in worker supply by paying more for workers (essentially passing down some of the efficiency gains in the form of increased wages). Since this approach would also improve domestic demand that the time that the economy is a bit stagnant, it would probably be good for everyone.
I'm often talking about how direct supply and demand relations seem to have broken with respect to managerial salaries (why aren't we outsourcing CEOs to India?). In these cases, I am often skeptical that the high wages paid to senior managers are really required to attract a competent candidate. But Cathy O'Neil points out that this issue is happening in reverse with entry level workers, where raising wages is seen as a taboo:
Of course, $50K isn’t nothing. But on the other hand, truckers have to be trained, competent, and regularly spend many days on the road. Moreover, the current surveillance technology has severely degraded their quality of life, which I learned by reading about Karen Levy’s work on the industry. Also, new truckers probably make substantially less than $50K when they start.
Partly the surveillance arose from the very real risk of truckers driving too much per day – it was an attempt to make sure truckers were driving safely. But since the technology has been installed in many large-company fleets, the companies have used it to essentially harass their drivers, telling them when break is over and so on. This has worked, in the sense that larger companies with more surveillance have managed to lower costs, pushing out smaller and individual truckers. And that means that truckers who used to own their own business now reluctantly work for huge companies.And consider:
When you make your workers lives worse, and you don’t compensate them with cash money to make up for it, you find your workers quitting. That’s what’s happening here.
In the comments we also have:
There’s no shortage of older, experienced drivers who publicly contemplate getting out of the business in response to the micromanagement of their workday. It’s not that the drivers don’t want to comply with the rules, though many of them do think many of the new rules make no sense, it’s that what they have to do to comply is often unrelated to real time conditions and circumstances and is often the wrong thing to do for both safety and efficiency. I often hear that they are blamed for not meeting schedules or other metrics even though they have no ability to do the things that would allow them to do so due to controls on both their driving and the engines of their trucks.Taken as a whole, I think that these issues are illustrative of a complete failure of industry to pay attention to the basic rules of supply and demand. If you offset the costs of training onto workers (get a license first), make the working conditions poor (constant surveillance), and then don't raise wages then it is unsurprising that you suddenly have worker shortages. Raise wages and give fixed term contracts (to make sure employment covers the cost of obtaining a license) -- then you might see the worker shortage vanish instantly.
It is remarkable that companies are acting like this and not addressing shortages with wages. It makes me suspect that there is some sort of "moral virtue" in paying workers less (or a political point about not wanting to pay people). Part of it is likely the "something for nothing" game -- if you don't count the costs of your new system on employee retention/morale then it looks like free productivity gains. Since people are "sticky" (it takes time to find a new job and the employees may hope that the bad plan will go away), there is a lag between the implementation and the subsequent HR issues.
The proposed solution to reduce the criterion for licenses is a short term fix that won't hold in the long run. A sufficiently bad job (high stress, low autonomy, moderate pay, much travel) is simply going to have to pay more to be competitive. If you don't believe me, double wages and see what happens.
However, the big point I want to make is that is appears that these companies don't seem to believe in the market economy, except when it is helpful to them. Otherwise they would respond to changes in worker supply by paying more for workers (essentially passing down some of the efficiency gains in the form of increased wages). Since this approach would also improve domestic demand that the time that the economy is a bit stagnant, it would probably be good for everyone.
Thursday, July 30, 2015
When your business model depends on finding miracle workers, you learn not to check behind the curtain
[This is not a post about the suicide of Jeanene Worrell-Breeden. As Slate pointed out, Ms. Worrell-Breeden was facing a number of personal tragedies and there is no value in speculating what role the cheating scandal played.]
Andrew Gelman is perplexed (perhaps rhetorically) by the decision of Columbia University Teachers College to hire a scandal-ridden administrator to run their elementary school.
This 2010 piece from the NYT spells out the idea behind the school.
From the Columbia Spectator:
From Susan Fuhrman, president of Teachers College [emphasis added]:
From Slate:
I apologize for hammering this point yet again, but it is important to note how strong cultural forces are within the education reform movement. This translates to a reflexive distrust and hostility to outside critics and a comparable sense of loyalty to those perceived as insiders. The most extreme case of this circle-the-wagons mentality is may be Michelle Rhee who still has the support of liberals like Talking Points Memo's lead education writer even after years of scandals, union-busting, and alliances with standard TPM villains like Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal.
Worrell-Breeden appears to be a well-established insider, having put in a quarter-century in the epicenter of the education reform movement (New York City) and having worked closely with the department of education. Add to this the Wall Street background (a huge plus in the world of education reform).
Under these circumstance, I'm not surprised that the people at CUTC were "able to live with" their new principal's serious (lying, stealing, forging) but relatively brief lapses. If anything, I suspect that even those mild reservations are being retconned in due to this latest scandal.
We should also keep in mind that Worrell-Breeden combined this insider status with very real accomplishments. Did she have a talent for conning powerful people? I don't think so, at least not in the way Andrew suggests. Rather she demonstrates one of the fundamental rules of organizational politics: if you're likable and useful, your superiors will forgive almost anything as long as you didn't do it directly to them.
As for the useful part, Worrell-Breeden looked like a possible miracle worker and that's what CUTC needed because the expectation of miracles was baked into the system. The stated mission of the school was to replicate the accomplishments of schools like the Success Academy schools, which was going to be difficult since SA largely relied on the educational equivalent of stage magic. The effect works on illusions and misdirection (if the audience's attention wanders to the wrong test the trick falls apart).
This is not to say that you can't find charter school successes (you certainly can) or that the much-touted no-excuses model can't do some good (there is research that suggests it can, though how far these results can be generalized is very much an open question), but the truly amazing stories that you hear about so often almost never hold up to scrutiny and those miracles have become a fundamental part of the movement's mythology.
To her credit, Worrell-Breeden did manage a great deal of what was asked of her. The school was wildly popular and got great press. CUTC was always happy to associate itself with her successes while the PR was good and if she had cooked her test data instead of falsifying it (which would have produced exactly the same result), they would probably still be bragging about their "dynamic principal."
Andrew Gelman is perplexed (perhaps rhetorically) by the decision of Columbia University Teachers College to hire a scandal-ridden administrator to run their elementary school.
Ummm, how bout this:Before we try to answer Andrew's questions, let's fill in some context.
The principal of a popular elementary school in Harlem acknowledged that she forged answers on students’ state English exams in April because the students had not finished the tests . . . As a result of the cheating, the city invalidated several dozen English test results for the school’s third grade.
The school is a new public school—it opened in 2011—that is run jointly by the New York City Department of Education and Columbia University Teachers College.
So far, it just seems like an unfortunate error. According to the news article, “Nancy Streim, associate vice president for school and community partnerships at Teachers College, said Ms. Worrell-Breeden had created a ‘culture of academic excellence'” at the previous school where she was principal. Maybe Worrell-Breeden just cared too much and was under too much pressure to succeed, she cracked and helped the students cheat.
But then I kept reading:
In 2009 and 2010, while Ms. Worrell-Breeden was at P.S. 18, she was the subject of two investigations by the special commissioner of investigation. The first found that she had participated in exercise classes while she was collecting what is known as “per session” pay, or overtime, to supervise an after-school program. The inquiry also found that she had failed to offer the overtime opportunity to others in the school, as required, before claiming it for herself.
The second investigation found that she had inappropriately requested and obtained notarized statements from two employees at the school in which she asked them to lie and say that she had offered them the overtime opportunity.
After those findings, we learn, “She moved to P.S. 30, another school in the Bronx, where she was principal briefly before being chosen by Teachers College to run its new school.”
So, let’s get this straight: She was found to be a liar, a cheat, and a thief, and then, with that all known, she was hired to two jobs as school principal??
The news article quotes Nancy Streim of Teachers College as saying, “We felt that on balance, her recommendations were so glowing from everyone we talked to in the D.O.E. that it was something that we just were able to live with.”
On balance, huh? Whatever else you can say about Worrell-Breeden, she seems to have had the talent of conning powerful people. Or maybe just one or two powerful people in the Department of Education who had the power to get her these jobs.
This is really bad. Is it so hard to find a school principal that you have no choice but to hire someone who lies, cheats, and steals?
It just seems weird to me. I accept that all of us have character flaws, but this is ridiculous. Principal is a supervisory position. What kind of toxic environment will you have in a school where the principal is in the habit of forging documents and instructing employees to lie? How could this possibly be considered a good idea?
This 2010 piece from the NYT spells out the idea behind the school.
One of the main arguments for charter schools is that they will improve the school system as a whole by introducing innovations that traditional schools then adopt. But charter school critics charge that this is not happening — and they say that charters on the whole are weakening the schools around them by siphoning off their resources.The new school proved enormously popular.
A new primary school proposed by Teachers College at Columbia University aims to address this issue head-on. The school’s goal, its founders say, is to transfer some of the best charter school features to a school run by the Department of Education, while showing how a primary school can benefit from a close affiliation with a college.
From the Columbia Spectator:
Though Teachers College Community School is younger than the kindergartners who are starting there this fall, the four-year-old Columbia-affiliated school on Morningside Avenue and 127th Street received more applications for its kindergarten seats this year than any other school in its district.And was held up as a great success.
Applications for the school’s kindergarten have been steadily increasing since it opened in 2011, school officials say. With 469 kids vying for 50 spots this year, TCCS has become the most sought-after kindergarten in most of Northern Manhattan.
“I think we’re on a very good trajectory,” Nancy Streim, TC’s associate vice president for school and community partnerships, said.
The increase comes even as parents voiced concerns earlier this year that the New York City Department of Education’s new online application portal, Kindergarten Connect, might prevent families without Internet connections from applying.
Streim, however, said that the school hasn’t experienced any problems on that front.
From Susan Fuhrman, president of Teachers College [emphasis added]:
A contingent from the conference toured TCCS on a chilly April morning. The visitors got to see the 1st- and 2nd-grade classes in action, with the students working in groups and independently. They also saw the new library and the demonstration kitchen, as well as specialized art, science and music classrooms. Then they heard from the school’s dynamic principal Jeanene Worrell-Breeden, a veteran New York City school administrator and a TC Cahn Fellow who has created an inclusive culture for the school’s students and active parent community. She described TCCS to the visitors as the culmination of her dream for a true community school.A lot of that success was credited to principal Worrell-Breeden.
...
TCCS students have been achieving positive outcomes thus far. For example, among kindergarten students, 99 percent completed the 2012-2013 school year at or above grade level in reading and writing. Among first-grade students, 83 percent ended the year at or above grade level in reading and writing. In math, 96 percent of kindergarteners and 90 percent of first-grade students ended the year at or above grade level. Next year, we’ll have the official city test results for third-graders.
TCCS also has received high marks from teachers and parents in a NYC Department of Education’s annual school survey that rates every school on perceptions of academic expectations, communication, engagement and safety and respect.
As TCCS shows much promise to improve student achievement and well-being, we are looking beyond our neighborhood to encourage other universities and their partners across the country to adapt this model for their own public community schools.
From Slate:
This tragedy seems to have come out of nowhere for the wildly popular Teachers College Community School, which is partnered with Columbia University’s Teachers College. Since opening in 2011, the school has become so sought-after that, this past year, it fielded 464 applications for just 50 kindergarten slots.Now some answers.
Worrell-Breeden had worked on Wall Street before starting a career in education 25 years ago. Though she’d been embroiled in scandal at her previous school—collecting overtime pay for supervising an after-school program when she was in fact working out with a personal trainer in the school gym three times a week—Worrell-Breeden landed the spot as founding principal of the Community School, where she made $138,000 a year. She was by all accounts a devoted and inspired leader of the school, and expectations were high for the school’s first year of testing. And maybe the expectations were part of the problem.
I apologize for hammering this point yet again, but it is important to note how strong cultural forces are within the education reform movement. This translates to a reflexive distrust and hostility to outside critics and a comparable sense of loyalty to those perceived as insiders. The most extreme case of this circle-the-wagons mentality is may be Michelle Rhee who still has the support of liberals like Talking Points Memo's lead education writer even after years of scandals, union-busting, and alliances with standard TPM villains like Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal.
Worrell-Breeden appears to be a well-established insider, having put in a quarter-century in the epicenter of the education reform movement (New York City) and having worked closely with the department of education. Add to this the Wall Street background (a huge plus in the world of education reform).
Under these circumstance, I'm not surprised that the people at CUTC were "able to live with" their new principal's serious (lying, stealing, forging) but relatively brief lapses. If anything, I suspect that even those mild reservations are being retconned in due to this latest scandal.
We should also keep in mind that Worrell-Breeden combined this insider status with very real accomplishments. Did she have a talent for conning powerful people? I don't think so, at least not in the way Andrew suggests. Rather she demonstrates one of the fundamental rules of organizational politics: if you're likable and useful, your superiors will forgive almost anything as long as you didn't do it directly to them.
As for the useful part, Worrell-Breeden looked like a possible miracle worker and that's what CUTC needed because the expectation of miracles was baked into the system. The stated mission of the school was to replicate the accomplishments of schools like the Success Academy schools, which was going to be difficult since SA largely relied on the educational equivalent of stage magic. The effect works on illusions and misdirection (if the audience's attention wanders to the wrong test the trick falls apart).
This is not to say that you can't find charter school successes (you certainly can) or that the much-touted no-excuses model can't do some good (there is research that suggests it can, though how far these results can be generalized is very much an open question), but the truly amazing stories that you hear about so often almost never hold up to scrutiny and those miracles have become a fundamental part of the movement's mythology.
To her credit, Worrell-Breeden did manage a great deal of what was asked of her. The school was wildly popular and got great press. CUTC was always happy to associate itself with her successes while the PR was good and if she had cooked her test data instead of falsifying it (which would have produced exactly the same result), they would probably still be bragging about their "dynamic principal."
Sometimes you just need the punchline
This is a very old joke with endless variations. You've probably heard it before, but I find the punchline useful in a wide range of situations, so I'll repeat it one more time to make sure everyone catches the reference.
A pilot, Michael Jordon, Bill Gates, the Pope, and a pizza delivery man were all in a plane together traveling through stormy conditions.
Suddenly, the pilot came running back to the passengers and announced that lightning had hit the plane, and they were going to crash in a matter of minutes. "There are only enough parachutes for four of the five of us," he announced. "Since I'm the pilot, I get one!" After saying this, the pilot grabbed a parachute and jumped out of the plane.
"I'm the world's greatest athlete," proclaimed Michael Jordon. "This world needs great athletes, so I must live." Michael Jordon then grabbed a parachute and leaped out of the plane.
"I'm the smarest man in the world," bragged Bill Gates. "The world needs smart men, so I must also live!" Bill Gates grabbed a parachute and jumped out of the plane.
At this point, the Pope began to speak. "I have lived a long life compared to you, and you may take the last parachute. I will go down with the plane."
"You don't have to stay here! The world's smartest man jumped out of the plane with my backpack."
Wednesday, July 29, 2015
The strange loves of pundit centrists
I've been meaning to write some posts about how the combination of bad polling data analysis combined with flawed but unquestioned assumptions have made the vast majority of recent political writing such an embarrassing waste of time. On that second point, Paul Krugman has been doing excellent work in response to the Trump surge, spelling out the odd rules "centrist" pundits play by then showing just how, in his words, delusional these pundits have become.
This is Krugman in prime pointing-out-the-naked-emperor mode. The writing is sharp and well-observed, but pretty much everything in the following paragraphs has long been obvious. I often hear these points made in conversation or the blogosphere, but (with this one exception) almost never in the mainstream press.
Pundit centrism in modern America is a strange thing. It’s not about policy, as you can see from the many occasions when members of the cult have demanded that Barack Obama change his ways and advocate things that … he was already advocating. What defines the cult is, instead, the insistence that the parties are symmetric, that they are equally extreme, and that the responsible, virtuous position is always somewhere in between.
The trouble is that this isn’t remotely true. Democrats constitute a normal political party, with some spread between its left and right wings, but in general espousing moderate positions. The GOP, on the other hand, is a deeply radical faction; even its supposed moderates are moderate only in tone, not in policy positions, and its base is motivated by anger against Others.
What this means, in turn, is that to sustain their self-image centrists must misrepresent reality.
On one side, they can’t admit the moderation of the Democrats, which is why you had the spectacle of demands that Obama change course and support his own policies.
On the other side, they have had to invent an imaginary GOP that bears little resemblance to the real thing. This means being continually surprised by the radicalism of the base. It also means a determination to see various Republicans as Serious, Honest Conservatives — SHCs? — whom the centrists know, just know, have to exist.
We saw this a lot in the cult of Paul Ryan, who was and is very obviously a con man, whose numbers have never added up, but who was nonetheless treated with vast respect — and still sometimes is.
But the ur-SHC is John McCain, the Straight-Talking Maverick. Never mind that he is clearly eager to wage as many wars as possible, that he has long since abandoned his once-realistic positions on climate change and immigration, that he tried to put Sarah Palin a heartbeat from the presidency. McCain the myth is who they see, and keep putting on TV. And they imagined that everyone else must see him the same way, that Trump’s sneering at his war record would cause everyone to turn away in disgust.
But the Republican base isn’t eager to hear from SHCs; it has never put McCain on a pedestal; and people who like Donald Trump are not exactly likely to be scared off by his lack of decorum.
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
Meritocracy
This is Joseph
I am a big fan of the idea of meritocracy -- the idea that personal qualities should sort people out into professions such that the "best" at a task (and who want to do a task) get to do it. It seems to be a very efficient way of jointly selecting on ability and inclination.
Then I read articles like this one and it becomes clear that we are certainly not living in this world now. Nor are we likely to get there soon under any modest tweak to the current economic system:
But for this system to be a meritocracy, you would have to assume a very high level of correlation between parents and children in terms of ability. And that ability was some sort of general thing, that could persist even as the nature or type of employment evolves over time. I suppose a very strong heritability model of something utterly general (like "IQ") might do*, if there were good research here showing massive effects**.
Absent that rather strong assumption, these types of associations suggest that, whatever social structure might cause meritocracy, the current culture does not qualify.
* Recent research (e.g. Maciej Trzaskowski, Nicole Harlaar, Rosalind Arden, Eva Krapohl, Kaili Rimfeld, Andrew McMillan, Philip S. Dale, Robert Plomin, Genetic influence on family socioeconomic status and children's intelligence, Intelligence, Volume 42, January–February 2014, Pages 83-88.) suggests that genes are associated with both SES and IQ (creating some real issues with effect separation). Also note that the proportion of variance explained is small. One needs huge effects to presume inherited wealth isn't an issue and we're not seeing this at all.
**Also see this NBER paper (abstract below):
I am a big fan of the idea of meritocracy -- the idea that personal qualities should sort people out into professions such that the "best" at a task (and who want to do a task) get to do it. It seems to be a very efficient way of jointly selecting on ability and inclination.
Then I read articles like this one and it becomes clear that we are certainly not living in this world now. Nor are we likely to get there soon under any modest tweak to the current economic system:
Then there is the group that the Zillow study dubs “double lucky.” These are the select few whose families had enough money to not only help them with college, but to then also assist them with a down payment on a home. This group accounts for more than half of the Millennial homeowners in the Zillow’s data, though they account for only 3 percent of the total Millennial population.Sure, there are small tweaks that we could do to reduce this level of intergenerational subsidy. Very high taxes on above median outcome sure could not hurt.
But for this system to be a meritocracy, you would have to assume a very high level of correlation between parents and children in terms of ability. And that ability was some sort of general thing, that could persist even as the nature or type of employment evolves over time. I suppose a very strong heritability model of something utterly general (like "IQ") might do*, if there were good research here showing massive effects**.
Absent that rather strong assumption, these types of associations suggest that, whatever social structure might cause meritocracy, the current culture does not qualify.
* Recent research (e.g. Maciej Trzaskowski, Nicole Harlaar, Rosalind Arden, Eva Krapohl, Kaili Rimfeld, Andrew McMillan, Philip S. Dale, Robert Plomin, Genetic influence on family socioeconomic status and children's intelligence, Intelligence, Volume 42, January–February 2014, Pages 83-88.) suggests that genes are associated with both SES and IQ (creating some real issues with effect separation). Also note that the proportion of variance explained is small. One needs huge effects to presume inherited wealth isn't an issue and we're not seeing this at all.
**Also see this NBER paper (abstract below):
Wealth is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use administrative data on the net wealth of a large sample of Swedish adoptees merged with similar information for their biological and adoptive parents. Comparing the relationship between the wealth of adopted and biological parents and that of the adopted child, we find that, even prior to any inheritance, there is a substantial role for environment and a much smaller role for genetics. We also examine the role played by bequests and find that, when they are taken into account, the role of adoptive parental wealth becomes much stronger. Our findings suggest that wealth transmission is not primarily because children from wealthier families are inherently more talented or more able but that, even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, wealth begets wealth.
Monday, July 27, 2015
Outlier by the Bay
As we have mentioned before, San Francisco is almost always a bad choice when trying to find cities to use as examples for economics, social science or urban planning. We are all an outlier on one axis or another, but San Francisco is a serial offender. Due to a number of extreme conditions and a long string of historical accidents, it is almost impossible to generalize any kind of conclusion drawn about the city.
But the very thing that makes San Francisco so unsuitable for analysis, also makes it incredibly attractive. There is a major subgenre of research and think tank fodder based on arguments and hypotheses that are only possible due to this and a handful of other equally extreme outliers. Of these, one of the most active and quite possibly the silliest involves housing prices and construction.
Check out what Gabriel Metcalf (president of the urban planning and policy think tank, SPUR) wrote in the Atlantic's CityLab:
San Francisco is a postage stamp.
The entire city has less land area than a seven-by-seven mile square. It's a great city. I love to visit. I have friends and family there. But it's a freaking POSTAGE STAMP! If you lose your keys, you can cover pretty much the whole thing just by having your friends link hands and walk slowly watching the ground.
The fact that this postage stamp is some of the world's most desirable real estate and it's just up the street from the epicenter of one of the world's major economic driver raises serious questions about the feasibility of building its way out of its problems..
Nor is Metcalf alone on this. Take a look at this graph from the Washington Post article,
How big cities that restrict new housing harm the economy from last year.
See what happens when you drop the Bay Area and other obvious outliers like Vegas and Honolulu. Then, just for fun, check out how much of the variability in both price and construction can be explained by density (gotta love Wikipedia).
For the record, I'm not taking a position on the relationship between housing costs and restrictions; I'm just saying that here, as with so many "data-driven" discussions, that rely heavily on the same handful of outliers and which ignore essential data and alternative hypotheses that often provide a better fit, are not worth taking seriously.
But the very thing that makes San Francisco so unsuitable for analysis, also makes it incredibly attractive. There is a major subgenre of research and think tank fodder based on arguments and hypotheses that are only possible due to this and a handful of other equally extreme outliers. Of these, one of the most active and quite possibly the silliest involves housing prices and construction.
Check out what Gabriel Metcalf (president of the urban planning and policy think tank, SPUR) wrote in the Atlantic's CityLab:
But for cities like San Francisco that now have 35 years of growth behind them, the urban problems of today are utterly different from what they were a generation or two ago. Instead of disinvestment, blight and stagnation, we are dealing with the problems of rapid change and the stresses of growth: congestion and, most especially, high housing costs.Metcalf goes on and on in this vein, but he spends virtually no time on what ought to be the lead paragraph.
When more people want to live in a city, it drives up the cost of housing—unless a commensurate amount of places to live are added. By the early 1990s it was clear that San Francisco had a fateful choice to make: Reverse course on its development attitudes, or watch America’s rekindled desire for city life overwhelm the openness and diversity that had made the city so special.
When San Francisco should have been building at least 5,000 new housing units a year to deal with the growing demand to live here, it instead averaged only about 1,500 a year over the course of several decades. In a world where we have the ability to control the supply of housing locally, but people still have the freedom to move where they want, all of this has played out in predictable ways.
San Francisco is a postage stamp.
The entire city has less land area than a seven-by-seven mile square. It's a great city. I love to visit. I have friends and family there. But it's a freaking POSTAGE STAMP! If you lose your keys, you can cover pretty much the whole thing just by having your friends link hands and walk slowly watching the ground.
The fact that this postage stamp is some of the world's most desirable real estate and it's just up the street from the epicenter of one of the world's major economic driver raises serious questions about the feasibility of building its way out of its problems..
Nor is Metcalf alone on this. Take a look at this graph from the Washington Post article,
How big cities that restrict new housing harm the economy from last year.
See what happens when you drop the Bay Area and other obvious outliers like Vegas and Honolulu. Then, just for fun, check out how much of the variability in both price and construction can be explained by density (gotta love Wikipedia).
For the record, I'm not taking a position on the relationship between housing costs and restrictions; I'm just saying that here, as with so many "data-driven" discussions, that rely heavily on the same handful of outliers and which ignore essential data and alternative hypotheses that often provide a better fit, are not worth taking seriously.
Friday, July 24, 2015
REPOST -- Maybe the [2012] Republican primary [was] going just as we should [have] expect[ed]
[This article by Sam Wang got me thinking about some posts I've been meaning to write about how most popular poll analyses could use more complex assumptions an about how everyone, including political scientists might benefit from more orthogonal data. I hit some of these topics four years ago so I thought I'd do a repost. Other than the correction of one typo, I'm leaving everything the way it was despite having some misgivings about the post.
One thing I do want to emphasize is that this is not a serious proposal; I'm just playing around with the idea that the interaction between desirability and perceived electability might explain some of the weirdness we saw in the last Republican Presidential primary (and the batshit craziness that we are, no doubt, about to see.]
I don't mean that in a snarky way. This is a completely non-snide post. I was just thinking about how even a quick little model with a few fairly intuitive assumptions can fit seemingly chaotic data surprisingly well. This probably won't look much like the models political scientists use (they have expertise and real data and reputations to protect). I'm just playing around.
But it can be a useful thought experiment, trying to explain all of the major data points with one fairly simple theory. Compare that to this bit of analysis from Amity Shlaes:
Surely we can do better than that.
Let's say that voters assign their support based on which candidate gets the highest score on a formula that looks something like this (assume each term has a coefficient and that those coefficients vary from voter to voter):
Score = Desirability + Electability(Desirability)
Where desirability is how much you would like to see that candidate as president and electability is roughly analogous to the candidate's perceived likelihood of making it through the primary and the general election.
Now let's make a few relatively defensible assumptions about electability:
electability is more or less a zero sum game;
it is also something like Keynes' beauty contest, an iterative process with everyone trying to figure out who everyone else is going to pick and throwing their support to the leading acceptable candidate;
desirability tends to be more stable than electability.
I almost added a third assumption that electability has momentum, but I think that follows from the iterative aspect.
What can we expect given these assumptions?
For starters, there are two candidates who should post very stable poll numbers though for very different reasons: Romney and Paul. Romney has consistently been seen as number one in general electability so GOP voters who find him acceptable will tend strongly to list him as their first choice even if they may not consider him the most desirable. While Romney's support comes mostly from the second term, Paul's comes almost entirely from the first. Virtually no one sees Paul as the most electable candidate in the field, but his supporters really, really like him.
It's with the rest, though, that the properties of the model start to do some interesting things. Since the most electable candidate is not acceptable to a large segment of the party faithful, perhaps even a majority, a great deal of support is going to go to the number two slot. If there were a clear ranking with a strong second place, this would not be a big deal, but this is a weak field with a relatively small spread in general electability. The result is a primary that's unstable and susceptible to noise.
Think about it this way: let's say the top non-Romney has a twelve percent perceived chance of getting to the White House, the second has eleven and the third has ten. Any number of trivial things can cause a three point shift which can easily cause first and third to exchange places. Suddenly the candidate who was polling at seven is breaking thirty and the pundits are scrambling to come up with an explanation that doesn't sound quite so much like guessing.
What the zero property and convergence can't explain, momentum does a pretty good job with. Take Perry. He came in at the last minute, seemingly had the election sewn up then dropped like a stone. Conventional wisdom usually ascribes this to bad debate performances and an unpopular stand on immigration but primary voters are traditionally pretty forgiving toward bad debates (remember Bush's Dean Acheson moment?) and most of the people who strongly disagreed with Perry's immigration stand already knew about it.
How about this for another explanation? Like most late entries, Perry was a Rorschach candidate and like most late entries, as the blanks were filled in Perry's standing dropped. The result was a downward momentum which Perry accelerated with a series of small but badly timed missteps. Viewed in this context, the immigration statement takes on an entirely different significance. It didn't have to lower Perry's desirability in order to hurt him in the polls; instead, it could have hurt his perceived electability by reminding people who weren't following immigration that closely that Perry had taken positions that other Republicans would object to.
Of course, showing how a model might possibly explain something doesn't prove anything, but it can make for an interesting thought experiment and it does, I hope, at least make a few points, like:
1. Sometimes a simple model can account for some complex and chaotic behavior;
2. Model structure matters. D + ED gives completely different results than D + E;
3. Things like momentum, zero sum constraints, convergence, and shifting to and from ordinal data can have some surprising implications, particularly when;
4. Your data hits some new extreme.
[For a look at what a real analysis of what's driving the poll numbers, you know where to go.]
One thing I do want to emphasize is that this is not a serious proposal; I'm just playing around with the idea that the interaction between desirability and perceived electability might explain some of the weirdness we saw in the last Republican Presidential primary (and the batshit craziness that we are, no doubt, about to see.]
I don't mean that in a snarky way. This is a completely non-snide post. I was just thinking about how even a quick little model with a few fairly intuitive assumptions can fit seemingly chaotic data surprisingly well. This probably won't look much like the models political scientists use (they have expertise and real data and reputations to protect). I'm just playing around.
But it can be a useful thought experiment, trying to explain all of the major data points with one fairly simple theory. Compare that to this bit of analysis from Amity Shlaes:
The answer is that this election cycle is different. Voters want someone for president who is ready to sit down and rewrite Social Security in January 2013. And move on to Medicare repair the next month. A policy technician already familiar with the difference between defined benefits and premium supports before he gets to Washington. What voters remember about Newt was that some of his work laid the ground for balancing the budget. He was leaving the speaker's job by the time that happened, but that experience was key.This theory might explain Gingrich's recent rise but it does a poor job with Bachmann and Perry and an absolutely terrible job with Cain. It's an explanation that covers a fraction of the data. Unfortunately, it's no worse than much of the analysis we've been seeing from professional political reporters and commentators.
Surely we can do better than that.
Let's say that voters assign their support based on which candidate gets the highest score on a formula that looks something like this (assume each term has a coefficient and that those coefficients vary from voter to voter):
Score = Desirability + Electability(Desirability)
Where desirability is how much you would like to see that candidate as president and electability is roughly analogous to the candidate's perceived likelihood of making it through the primary and the general election.
Now let's make a few relatively defensible assumptions about electability:
electability is more or less a zero sum game;
it is also something like Keynes' beauty contest, an iterative process with everyone trying to figure out who everyone else is going to pick and throwing their support to the leading acceptable candidate;
desirability tends to be more stable than electability.
I almost added a third assumption that electability has momentum, but I think that follows from the iterative aspect.
What can we expect given these assumptions?
For starters, there are two candidates who should post very stable poll numbers though for very different reasons: Romney and Paul. Romney has consistently been seen as number one in general electability so GOP voters who find him acceptable will tend strongly to list him as their first choice even if they may not consider him the most desirable. While Romney's support comes mostly from the second term, Paul's comes almost entirely from the first. Virtually no one sees Paul as the most electable candidate in the field, but his supporters really, really like him.
It's with the rest, though, that the properties of the model start to do some interesting things. Since the most electable candidate is not acceptable to a large segment of the party faithful, perhaps even a majority, a great deal of support is going to go to the number two slot. If there were a clear ranking with a strong second place, this would not be a big deal, but this is a weak field with a relatively small spread in general electability. The result is a primary that's unstable and susceptible to noise.
Think about it this way: let's say the top non-Romney has a twelve percent perceived chance of getting to the White House, the second has eleven and the third has ten. Any number of trivial things can cause a three point shift which can easily cause first and third to exchange places. Suddenly the candidate who was polling at seven is breaking thirty and the pundits are scrambling to come up with an explanation that doesn't sound quite so much like guessing.
What the zero property and convergence can't explain, momentum does a pretty good job with. Take Perry. He came in at the last minute, seemingly had the election sewn up then dropped like a stone. Conventional wisdom usually ascribes this to bad debate performances and an unpopular stand on immigration but primary voters are traditionally pretty forgiving toward bad debates (remember Bush's Dean Acheson moment?) and most of the people who strongly disagreed with Perry's immigration stand already knew about it.
How about this for another explanation? Like most late entries, Perry was a Rorschach candidate and like most late entries, as the blanks were filled in Perry's standing dropped. The result was a downward momentum which Perry accelerated with a series of small but badly timed missteps. Viewed in this context, the immigration statement takes on an entirely different significance. It didn't have to lower Perry's desirability in order to hurt him in the polls; instead, it could have hurt his perceived electability by reminding people who weren't following immigration that closely that Perry had taken positions that other Republicans would object to.
Of course, showing how a model might possibly explain something doesn't prove anything, but it can make for an interesting thought experiment and it does, I hope, at least make a few points, like:
1. Sometimes a simple model can account for some complex and chaotic behavior;
2. Model structure matters. D + ED gives completely different results than D + E;
3. Things like momentum, zero sum constraints, convergence, and shifting to and from ordinal data can have some surprising implications, particularly when;
4. Your data hits some new extreme.
[For a look at what a real analysis of what's driving the poll numbers, you know where to go.]
Thursday, July 23, 2015
The Apple Tax
From the Onion: Al Franken and the FTC are investigating the so-called “Apple Tax” for rival streaming services
[I assume by this point everyone knows these aren't safe for work.]
In a sentence that would make frighteningly little sense to a someone who fell into a coma in 1995 and just awakened today, [As a side note, if I were writing for that publication, I don't think I'd open with a "things were sure different twenty years ago" gag. As a friend of mine mentioned in a conversation recently, twenty years ago, the Onion was the place to go for smart, fresh humor writing while Cracked was a tired magazine your father used to read. -- MP] Saturday Night Live-writer-turned-senator Al Franken has called on the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department to investigate whether successful computer manufacturer and music provider Apple may have engaged in anti-competitive behavior against rival music streaming services like Spotify or Rdio.It's too late to go into a big discussion of anti-trust and vertical integration and monopsony and all that jazz (or, more accurately, too late for me to read through all of the Wikipedia pages on anti-trust and vertical integration and monopsony so I can sound knowledgeable about all that jazz), so I'll leave it to the readers to draw their own conclusions about the concentration of economic power in media and finish up with this clip from College Humor.
...
The crux of the investigation comes down to the multi-faceted relationship between Apple and the streaming services it both supports and competes against. As the proprietor of iOS’s App Store, the company has a huge amount of control over those streamers’ access to their consumer base, many of whom use their iPhones to play music while on the go. But with the advent of the company’s own Apple Music service, Apple is now in direct competition with those same companies, who it assigns a 30 percent surcharge to operate in the Store.
...
The company was previously suggested to have manipulated music licensees into dropping out of Spotify’s free streaming service, a practice that also invited investigation from the FTC.
[I assume by this point everyone knows these aren't safe for work.]
Wednesday, July 22, 2015
Let's all take a moment to close our eyes and picture ourselves desecrating the grave of William Proxmire
It hit me the other day that, while I frequently go after Republicans for taking cheap shots at science and research for personal and political game, I don't think I have ever mentioned that the politician who perfected the art was a Democrat. So the next time that John McCain and Maureen Dowd go all giggly over agricultural research, we should all take a moment and thank William Proxmire for getting things started.
Proxmire wasn't even an ethical whore. When a project he'd mocked became too popular (such as SETI), his principled opposition suddenly vanished. He was relentlessly and transparently self-serving, but he was able to get away with it because there were plenty of reporters willing to print a good story even if it wasn't actually true.
In a sense, he is still getting away with it. The ongoing war on data owes a great deal to the late senator.
Golden Fleece AwardIf you read some of the descriptions of the awards, it becomes obvious that, like McCain and Dowd after him, Proxmire didn't care about the potential of the research or even the magnitude of the waste; all that mattered was whether or not he could frame the project in a way that made it sound silly. Here's my favorite example: "He gave the award to a study of the sex life of the screw-worm fly. The results were used to create sterile screw-worms that were released into the wild and eliminated this major cattle parasite from the US and reducing the cost of beef across the globe."
Proxmire was noted for issuing his Golden Fleece Award.,[5] which was presented monthly between 1975 and 1988, in order to focus media attention on projects Proximire viewed as self-serving and wasteful of taxpayer dollars.[1] The first Golden Fleece Award was awarded in 1975 to the National Science Foundation, for funding an $84,000 study on why people fall in love.[1] Other Golden Fleece awards over the years were awarded to the Justice Department for conducting a study on why prisoners wanted to get out of jail, the National Institute of Mental Health to study a Peruvian brothel ("The researchers said they made repeated visits in the interests of accuracy," reported The New York Times), and the Federal Aviation Administration, for studying "the physical measurements of 432 airline stewardesses, paying special attention to the 'length of the buttocks.'"[1]
Proxmire's critics claimed that some of his awards went to basic science projects that led to important breakthroughs. In some circles his name has become a verb, meaning to unfairly obstruct scientific research for political gain, as in "the project has been proxmired". In 1987, Stewart Brand accused Proxmire of recklessly attacking legitimate research for the crass purpose of furthering his own political career, with gross indifference as to whether his assertions were true or false as well as the long-term effects on American science and technology policy.[13] Proxmire later apologized for several cancelled projects, including SETI.
One winner of the Golden Fleece Award, Ronald Hutchinson, sued Proxmire for defamation in 1976. Proxmire claimed that his statements about Hutchinson's research were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that that clause does not immunize members of Congress from liability for defamatory statements made outside of formal congressional proceedings (Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)). The case was eventually settled out of court.[14]
Proxmire wasn't even an ethical whore. When a project he'd mocked became too popular (such as SETI), his principled opposition suddenly vanished. He was relentlessly and transparently self-serving, but he was able to get away with it because there were plenty of reporters willing to print a good story even if it wasn't actually true.
In a sense, he is still getting away with it. The ongoing war on data owes a great deal to the late senator.
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